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## 1ac---ECS

### plan---1ac

#### Plan: The United States federal government should prohibit private sector business practices that violate an effective competition antitrust standard.

### economy---1ac

#### The advantage is the economy---

#### Current market consolidation undermines innovation, slows growth, and suppresses productivity---promoting competition solves.

Fiona M. Scott Morton 20. Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at the Yale University School of Management. “Reforming U.S. antitrust enforcement and competition policy,” https://equitablegrowth.org/reforming-u-s-antitrust-enforcement-and-competition-policy/.

Evidence that antitrust laws are falling short is plentiful. Many cartels go undiscovered, and tacit collusion is probably even more prevalent because it is harder for antitrust enforcers to prosecute and deter.9 Anticompetitive horizontal mergers (between rivals) appear to be underdeterred.10 A variety of clever strategies used by incumbents to exclude entrants, either by purchasing them when they are nascent or using tactics to confine them to a less threatening niche or forcing them to exit have been successfully deployed in recent years, often when antitrust enforcement is late or absent.11 Each of these sources of concern can be critiqued, but together they make a compelling case. Some of the evidence may have benign explanations in part, such as the growing importance of fixed costs, for example, when creating software or pharmaceuticals that leads naturally to higher markups, or the increasing benefit of being on the same platform with other users (known as “network effects” in the case of a social media site). Firms in industries with high fixed costs or large network externalities may exhibit high profits and productivity and low labor shares, and may earn high profits because they had a good idea early and executed well, thereby getting adoption from many consumers.12 Nonetheless, the overall picture is clear that market power has been growing in the United States for decades. Moreover, even where the explanation for growing market power is benign, we must ensure that companies do not use anticompetitive tactics to protect their position. Firms with market power need not compete aggressively to sell their products, so they tend to raise prices, reduce quality, and/or innovate less. Market power can also contribute to slowed economic growth by, for example, suppressing productivity increases.13 Theoretical and empirical economic studies convincingly show that innovation is harmed by anticompetitive conduct.14 This is why antitrust enforcement is such a terrific policy tool to strengthen competition—it does not come with an efficiency downside, as do most policies that redistribute income. Policies that enhance competition are unambiguously beneficial for efficiency, as well as inclusive prosperity, with minor qualifications.15 Other policies for addressing inequality, in particular, such as labor market and tax policies, may create disincentives or allocative efficiency losses that must be weighed against their distributional benefits. Policies to enhance competition, by contrast, offer what is close to a free lunch.16

#### An effective competition standard reinvigorates antitrust.

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America, as legal and economic scholars are increasingly noting, has a market power problem. The emerging evidence points to less competition, higher markups, greater concentration, and widening wealth and income inequality. The current state of competition law benefits the select few—at the expense of nearly everyone else. Our antitrust laws are supposed to deal with concentrated economic power. The problem is that the laws have been hijacked in two ways. First, ideologues narrowed the substance of antitrust from addressing a variety of goals to focusing solely on the concept of consumer welfare—namely, that harm to competition within the legal meaning of the antitrust laws consists solely of harm to consumers and their welfare, as measured almost exclusively by price and quantity effects in output markets. Second, some courts and enforcers went even further, declining to find antitrust liability in conduct that harms consumers on the theory that it carries other benefits, like long-run economic growth. Recent US Supreme Court decisions, including Ohio v American Express Co, and the US District Court’s decision to allow the AT&T/Time Warner merger illustrate how antitrust, under the prevailing consumer welfare standard, has been weakened and distorted beyond all recognition. Courts have elevated the burden of proof on the government and other antitrust plaintiffs to such an extent that the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts have become unenforceable for many anticompetitive practices, other than cartels. If the United States continues with a light-if-any-touch antitrust review of mergers and turns a blind eye to abuses by dominant firms, concentration and crony capitalism will likely increase, competition and our well-being will decrease further, and power and profits will continue to fall into fewer hands. Startups, small and midsize firms, and Americans more broadly—as workers, consumers, and democratic citizens—will be left to the beneficence or spite of a few powerful, but arbitrary, corporations. This trend is reversible if we restore antitrust as a guarantor of effective competition. To tackle today’s market power problem, we offer an effective competition antitrust standard to replace the prevailing consumer welfare standard, which courts and scholars have interpreted differently (and at times inconsistently). The effective competition standard restores the primary aim of the antitrust laws—namely, the dispersion and deconcentration of significant private power wherever in the economy it is to be found, including throughout supply chains and in the labor market.

#### It's enforceable and sufficient.

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The effective competition standard differs from both the consumer welfare standard and the total welfare standard in that it expressly departs from the partial-equilibrium analysis of a single market as the basis for antitrust analysis. The effective competition standard further differs from the consumer welfare standard in four important ways: • First, a substantial lessening of competition suffices for liability. Enforcers and courts need not demonstrate how the lessening of competition harms consumers, nor balance the harms to one set of stakeholders against the supposed benefits for another. In this respect, the effective competition standard makes antitrust more enforceable. • Second, it recognizes that competition needs competitors. Thus, it takes a tougher stance on monopolistic, predatory, and exclusionary practices, which often reduce the competitive opportunities for entrants and rivals. • Third, unlike the consumer welfare standard, which considers the impact only on consumers, the effective competition standard protects market participants throughout the supply chain, including workers and sellers. • Finally, by eliminating the precarious step of how the lessening of competition will harm consumers’ welfare, the effective competition standard restores the purpose of the Clayton Act to “arrest restraints of trade in their incipiency and before they develop into full-fledged restraints violative of the Sherman Act.” As Congress noted, “A requirement of certainty and actuality of injury to competition is incompatible with any effort to supplement the Sherman Act by reaching incipient restraints.” To promote competition and innovation in our heavily concentrated markets, the effective competition standard would depart from today’s light-touch antitrust policies in the following areas.

#### Scenario 1 is Growth---

#### Sustained anti-competitive behavior is regressive and makes economic collapse inevitable.

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The direct cost of anti-competitive behavior is high. Many studies estimate this cost by implied price overcharge, typically stemming from identified cartels. A common approach to estimating the price overcharge consists in applying a difference-in-difference technique, that is, by comparing prices in a market before and after an infringement was identified (e.g., a cartel) to a “counterfactual” market in a different location or product market where no infringement was identified.3 The estimated price overcharges in advanced economies are found to be large on average, ranging from 15 to about 50 percent. Ivaldi et al. (2017) extends these estimationsto 20 developing economies, using a database of over 200 major cartel episodes over 1995–2013. They estimate that the harm to the economy in terms of excess profits resulting from price overcharges could reach about 4 percent of GDP, accounting for the probability of undetected cartels. The cost of cartels could extend to overcharges in intermediate goods, ultimately affecting finished products, as well as procurement of public goods, or it could also affect the economy through a reduction in output (World Bank-OECD 2017). Even without cartels, anti-competitive behavior would result in higher prices and lower production. There is also growing evidence that the lack of competition not only affects more strongly the poorest countries but also hurts the poor more in each country. Higher market power in food, beverages and medicines was shown to be regressive, that is, they hurt more the poorest, as shown using Mexican data (Urzua 2013). Similar results exist in the context of advanced countries (e.g., Creedy and Dixon 1998 and 2000). There is also evidence that prices in sub-Saharan Africa are higher than in other developing regions, controlling for income and other factors. The extra cost of living in this region is negatively correlated with aggregate measures of competition (IMF 2019a). OECD (2017), using a calibrated model on a selected group of advanced countries, finds that market power could be responsible for a sizable increase in the wealth of the richest 10 percent and a large reduction in the income of the poorest 20 percent.The decline in the labor share has also been interpreted as a sign of rising market power. Labor share has been decreasing in the U.S. and other advanced economies (IMF 2019b). This decline in labor share could be explained to a large extent as a result of the Information Technology (IT) revolution as argued by Aghion and others (2019). This revolution allowed superstar firms to expand into many sectors of the economy. As these firms have higher markups and lower labor shares than non-superstar firms, the decline in aggregate labor share and corresponding increase in aggregate markups reflect a “composition effect”. In other words, it is not the result of a within-firm increase in markup or a decline in labor share. Evidence of the predominance of a “between-firm” (or “composition”) effect over a “within-firm” effect is provided by De Locker and Eeckout (2019) and Baqaae and Farhi (2019). IMF (2019b) shows that the “reallocation” effect is pronounced in the U.S. but less so in other advanced countries. The long-term effect of this increasing hegemony of superstar firms has been to discourage innovation and entry by non-superstar firms, thereby leading to a decrease in aggregate productivity growth, broad-based growth, and business dynamism. This increasing hegemony, in turn, has been facilitated by an insufficient regulation of mergers and acquisitions, in other words by a competition policy, which has not adapted to the digital economy.

#### State-based market interventions are key to sustainable growth. The alternative to well-measured corrections is an unfettered and regressive free market.

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There is a positive correlation between long-term growth and poverty alleviation. More specifically, Lant Pritchett argues, based on cross-country patterns, that “broad-based growth, defined as the process that raises median income, is far and away the most important source of poverty reduction.”9 The sharp decline in poverty rates in China (about 800 million people escaped poverty) amid the two decades of break-neck growth is the starkest illustration. As discussed, innovation-based growth based on Schumpeterian creative destruction is key to productivity gains and sustained growth. The question is how to achieve broad-based, high and sustained growth which means to spur the emergence of good paying jobs. This is perhaps one of the most difficult and debated questions in economics. The standard view shared by most economists over the last few decades is that “horizontal policies”, that is improvements in education, the quality of institutions, infrastructure, business environment, and regulations are key. Many of these policies tackle what is known as “government failures” as described in Rodrik (2005). In other words, state intervention should limit itself to providing public goods and the provision of a good environment while crucially ensuring an adequate level of competition. In this context, firms would have the incentive to invest and deploy efforts to be competitive through improvements in productivity and innovation to offer new and better-quality goods among others. However, growth can be harmed by anti-competitive behaviors or distortive policies which can take different and subtle forms and are not always easy to gauge. Among these, imposing barriers to entry or helping non-performing firms remain in business, could have a substantial negative effect. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) emphasize the importance of input reallocation effects. They show that aggregate productivity differentials can be explained by differences in terms of the distribution of firms’ productivity. This means that relatively less productive firms have access to a considerable share of the resources. They argue that it is harder for a more productive firm to grow but also easier for a less productive firm to survive in India than in the U.S. for example. In the same vein, Aghion (2016) suggests that that there is more business dynamism in the U.S. than India, that is more firms enter and exit, which would explain input misallocation and differences in income per capita. Compared to the U.S., potential constraints in developing economies such as India include more rigid capital markets and labor/product markets, the lower supply of skills, the poorer quality of infrastructure, and the lower quality of institutions to protect property rights and to enforce contracts. However, even if markets are perfectly competitive and an adequate environment is ensured, the economy may still not reach its full potential. This is because of “market failures,” which typically happen in the presence of externalities. They are at play when firms and workers do not fully internalize the effects of their decisions on the broader economy and their dynamic implications. Typically, they are learning externalities, coordination failures, or information asymmetries (Rodrik 2005). As argued by many, (e.g., Arrow 1962) and Matsuyama 1992) some activities entail higher productivity gains, or more learning potential, for an economy compared to other traditional activities such as non-tradable services or agriculture. Firms may not be fully aware of these productivity gains, leading to lower output in high-productivity sectors and lower relative incomes over time. The coordination failure is based on the idea that a critical size of the modern sector is needed for a firm to enter it. It would be profitable for a firm to invest in a modern sector only if there are enough firms investing simultaneously in other modern sectors. If many firms invest together in modern sectors, described as the “big push,” economy reaches a higher level of productivity and development (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Murphy et al. 1989). Lastly, information asymmetries exist if there is imperfect information about new markets and products, and firms underinvest as a result (Hausman and Rodrik 2003). This is clearly seen in firms trying to export and penetrate new geographical markets with their products. In theory, tackling these externalities would necessitate a state intervention, broadly defined as industrial policy. However, the scope, the tools and whether it could in practice be superior to a more “laissez-faire” approach, leaving the outcome to unfettered competition, is the object of an ongoing debate. At the heart of the debate lies the definition of what constitutes a “modern” sector, which is conducive to productivity gains and spillovers to the rest of the economy. While it is typically associated with manufacturing (Matsuyama 1992 and Krugman 1987) or related to the concept of sophistication (Hausman, Hwang and Rodrik 2007 and Cherif and Hasanov 2019), others argue that service sectors could also play a role (IMF 2018). More important for inclusive growth, if a sector is to be targeted, it should help achieve broad-based growth to contribute to poverty alleviation. In practice it means that it should also generate (directly or indirectly) enough employment, and the level of skills to fill those jobs should be realistically met over the medium term. The other key question relates to how state intervention to tackle externalities could curtail or distort competition. Indeed, state interventions of the past typically followed the model of import-substitution policies. The main idea was to protect domestic producers from international competition by imposing barriers to trade, such as high tariffs. In many cases, the curtailment of competition went further and encompassed the domestic market as countries relied on one or very few “champions” to achieve import-substitution goals. The many past failed cases in Latin America and the Middle East imply that such policies may be counterproductive in general (Cherif and Hasanov 2019). The comparison of Malaysia’s foray into automotive industry in the 1970s with its champion Proton to the success of Korea’s Hyundai is a case in point (Cherif and Hasanov 2019b). After decades of support and protection from domestic and international competition, Proton depended on imports of critical inputs, including the engine. The high tariffs to protect it also meant that consumers had to pay higher prices for lower quality products. In comparison, although Hyundai benefitted from state support as well, it was also forced early on to compete both on the domestic and international markets. It could be argued that competition provided Hyundai with an incentive to innovate and take advantage of economies of scale. Moreover, support for firms could be pursued without necessarily implying less competition. Aghion and others (2015) develop a simple model showing that targeted subsidies can be used to induce several firms to operate in the same sector, and that the more competitive the sector is, the more it will induce firms to innovate in order to “escape competition” (Aghion et. al. 2005). Of course, a lot depends upon the design of industrial policy. Such policy should target sectors, not particular firms (Aghion 2016). Using Chinese firm-level panel data, Aghion and others (2015) look at the interaction between state subsidies to a sector and the level of product market competition in that sector. They show that TFP, TFP growth, and product innovation (defined as the ratio between output value generated by new products to total output value) are all positively correlated with the interaction between state aid to the sector and market competition in the sector. In other words, the more competitive the recipient sector is, the more positive the effects of targeted state subsidies to that sector are. Infact, for sectors with low degree of competition the effects are negative, whereas the effects become positive in sectors with sufficiently high degree of competition. Finally, the interaction between state aid and product market competition in the sector is more positive when state aid is less concentrated. Yet, there are externalities that can be tackled without curtailing competition with the potential to have a sizable contribution to broad-based growth and poverty alleviation. These are typically related to informational asymmetries. Bloom and Van Reenen (2010), f or example, show that interventions to improve management practices in Indian small firms can significantly improve productivity. So did the productivity missions of the Marshall Plan in Europe after the WWII (Giorcelli 2019). In the same vein, Atkin et al. (2017) showed that Egyptian rug producers can be helped to access export markets by tackling informational asymmetries and coordination failures. In other words, they showed that interventions such as export promotion agencies can help SMEs advertise their products in foreign markets and act as a communication channel between them and customers. They also showed that export activities helped small producers improve their quality and value added which confirms the importance of export orientation. This focus on SMEs can help increase productivity and tackle inequality at the same time. The trade-off between the benefits and costs of state intervention suggests that the way the state intervenes in the economy is crucial. This intervention needs to be cognizant of exacerbating government failures such as rent-seeking and corruption. Moreover, even if these interventions are successful in the sense that they create competitive industries and contribute to growth, they should avoid creating “islands” of relatively advanced sectors. If these sectors are disconnected from the rest of the economy, broad-based growth may not be sustained, and it would exacerbate inequality. For example, thanks to interventions and targeted policies, Costa Rica managed to foster a high-tech sector in electronics and health instruments (Spar 1998). Although it led to higher growth and declining poverty as well as productivity improvements in agricultural sectors, high inequality persisted while growth policies for inclusiveness were missing (Ferreira, Fuentes, and Ferreira 2018).

#### COVID creates an economic brink---recovery is strong now because of effective monetary policy, but we’ve hit the zero-lower bound.

Christopher Rugaber 21. Associated Press. “Federal Reserve keeps key interest rate near zero, signals COVID-19 economic risks receding.” https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-biz-fed-interest-rates-economy-20210428-bumyc3ynpza6ri4ygsntmdsmya-story.html.

WASHINGTON — The Federal Reserve is keeping its ultra-low interest rate policies in place, a sign that it wants to see more evidence of a strengthening economic recovery before it would consider easing its support. In a statement Wednesday, the Fed expressed a brighter outlook, saying the economy has improved along with the job market. And while the policymakers noted that inflation has risen, they ascribed the increase to temporary factors. The Fed also signaled its belief that the pandemic’s threat to the economy has diminished, a significant point given Chair Jerome Powell’s long-stated view that the recovery depends on the virus being brought under control. Last month, the Fed had cautioned that the virus posed “considerable risks to the economic outlook.” On Wednesday, it said only that “risks to the economic outlook remain” because of the pandemic. The central bank left its benchmark short-term rate near zero, where it’s been since the pandemic erupted nearly a year ago, to help keep loan rates down to encourage borrowing and spending. It also said in a statement after its latest policy meeting that it would keep buying $120 billion in bonds each month to try to keep longer-term borrowing rates low. The U.S. economy has been posting unexpectedly strong gains in recent weeks, with barometers of hiring, spending and manufacturing all surging. Most economists say they detect the early stages of what could be a robust and sustained recovery, with coronavirus case counts declining, vaccinations rising and Americans spending their stimulus-boosted savings.

#### Eroding financial resilience causes war---that overcomes traditional barriers to conflict.

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Economic recovery efforts since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis have mainly depended on unconventional monetary policies. As fears rise of yet another international financial crisis, there are growing concerns about the increased possibility of large-scale military conflict. More worryingly, in the current political landscape, prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising economic inequality, chauvinistic ethno-populism as well as aggressive jingoist rhetoric, including threats, could easily spin out of control and ‘morph’ into military conflict, and worse, world war. Crisis responses limited The 2008-2009 global financial crisis almost ‘bankrupted’ governments and caused systemic collapse. Policymakers managed to pull the world economy from the brink, but soon switched from counter-cyclical fiscal efforts to unconventional monetary measures, primarily ‘quantitative easing’ and very low, if not negative real interest rates. But while these monetary interventions averted realization of the worst fears at the time by turning the US economy around, they did little to address underlying economic weaknesses, largely due to the ascendance of finance in recent decades at the expense of the real economy. Since then, despite promising to do so, policymakers have not seriously pursued, let alone achieved, such needed reforms. Instead, ostensible structural reformers have taken advantage of the crisis to pursue largely irrelevant efforts to further ‘casualize’ labour markets. This lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented liquidity central banks injected into economies has not been well allocated to stimulate resurgence of the real economy. From bust to bubble Instead, easy credit raised asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. US house prices are now 8% more than at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, while its price-to-earnings ratio in late 2018 was even higher than in 2008 and in 1929, when the Wall Street Crash precipitated the Great Depression. As monetary tightening checks asset price bubbles, another economic crisis — possibly more severe than the last, as the economy has become less responsive to such blunt monetary interventions — is considered likely. A decade of such unconventional monetary policies, with very low interest rates, has greatly depleted their ability to revive the economy. The implications beyond the economy of such developments and policy responses are already being seen. Prolonged economic distress has worsened public antipathy towards the culturally alien — not only abroad, but also within. Thus, another round of economic stress is deemed likely to foment unrest, conflict, even war as it is blamed on the foreign. International trade shrank by two-thirds within half a decade after the US passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in 1930, at the start of the Great Depression, ostensibly to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition! Liberalization’s discontents Rising economic insecurity, inequalities and deprivation are expected to strengthen ethno-populist and jingoistic nationalist sentiments, and increase social tensions and turmoil, especially among the growing precariat and others who feel vulnerable or threatened.Thus, ethno-populist inspired chauvinistic nationalism may exacerbate tensions, leading to conflicts and tensions among countries, as in the 1930s. Opportunistic leaders have been blaming such misfortunes on outsiders and may seek to reverse policies associated with the perceived causes, such as ‘globalist’ economic liberalization. Policies which successfully check such problems may reduce social tensions, as well as the likelihood of social turmoil and conflict, including among countries. However, these may also inadvertently exacerbate problems. The recent spread of anti-globalization sentiment appears correlated to slow, if not negative per capita income growth and increased economic inequality. To be sure, globalization and liberalization are statistically associated with growing economic inequality and rising ethno-populism. Declining real incomes and growing economic insecurity have apparently strengthened ethno-populism and nationalistic chauvinism, threatening economic liberalization itself, both within and among countries. Insecurity, populism, conflict Thomas Piketty has argued that a sudden increase in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Although causality is difficult to prove, with wealth and income inequality now at historical highs, this should give cause for concern. Of course, other factors also contribute to or exacerbate civil and international tensions, with some due to policies intended for other purposes. Nevertheless, even if unintended, such developments could inadvertently catalyse future crises and conflicts. Publics often have good reason to be restless, if not angry, but the emotional appeals of ethno-populism and jingoistic nationalism are leading to chauvinistic policy measures which only make things worse. At the international level, despite the world’s unprecedented and still growing interconnectedness, multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed as the US increasingly resorts to unilateral, sovereigntist policies without bothering to even build coalitions with its usual allies. Avoiding Thucydides’ iceberg Thus, protracted economic distress, economic conflicts or another financial crisis could lead to military confrontation by the protagonists, even if unintended. Less than a decade after the Great Depression started, the Second World War had begun as the Axis powers challenged the earlier entrenched colonial powers. They patently ignored Thucydides’ warning, in chronicling the Peloponnesian wars over two millennia before, when the rise of Athens threatened the established dominance of Sparta! Anticipating and addressing such possibilities may well serve to help avoid otherwise imminent disasters by undertaking pre-emptive collective action, as difficult as that may be.

#### Those wars draw-in great powers---that outweighs.

Lawrence H. Summers 17. US Secretary of the Treasury (1999-2001) and Director of the US National Economic Council (2009-2010), former president of Harvard University, where he is currently University Professor. “Will the Center Hold?” <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12?a_la=english&a_d=5a37edac78b6c709b8d260dd&a_m=&a_a=click&a_s=&a_p=%2Fsection%2Feconomics&a_li=recession-or-financial-crisis-political-fallout-by-lawrence-h--summers-2017-12&a_pa=section-commentaries&a_ps>=.

The risk from a purely economic point of view is that the traditional strategy for battling recession – a reduction of 500 basis points in the federal funds rate – will be unavailable this year, given the zero lower bound on interest rates. Nor is it clear that the will or the room for fiscal expansion will exist. This means that the next recession, like the last, may well be protracted and deep, with severe global consequences. And the political capacity for a global response, like that on display at the London G-20 Summit in 2009, appears to be absent as well. Just compare the global visions of US President Barack Obama and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown back then with those of Trump and Prime Minister Theresa May today. I shudder to think what a serious recession will mean for politics and policy. It is hard to imagine avoiding a resurgence of protectionism, populism, and scapegoating. In such a scenario, as with another financial crisis, the center will not hold. But the greatest risk in the next few years, I believe, is neither a market meltdown nor a recession. It is instead a political doom loop in which voters’ conclusion that government does not work effectively for them becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Candidates elected on platforms of resentment delegitimize the governments they lead, fueling further resentment and even more problematic new leaders. Cynicism pervades. How else can one explain how the candidacy of Roy Moore for a US Senate seat? Moore, who was twice dismissed for cause from his post on the Alabama Supreme Court, and who is credibly charged with sexually assaulting teenage girls when he was in his 30s, could enter the US Senate as many of his colleagues look the other way. If a country’s citizens lose confidence in their government’s ability to improve their lives, the government has an incentive to rally popular support by focusing attention on threats that only it can address. That is why in societies pervaded by anger and uncertainty about the future, the temptation to stigmatize minority groups increases. And it is why there is a tendency for officials to magnify foreign threats. We are seeing this phenomenon all over the world. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Chinese President Xi Jinping have all made nationalism a central part of their governing strategy. So, too, has Trump, who has explicitly rejected the international community in favor of the idea that there is only a ceaseless struggle among nation-states for competitive advantage. When the world’s preeminent power, having upheld the idea of international community for nearly 75 years, rejects it in favor of ad hoc deal making, others have no choice but to follow suit. Countries that can no longer rely on the US feel pressure to provide for their own security. America’s adversaries inevitably will seek to fill the voids left behind as the US retrenches.

#### Even if growth is imperfect, the transition away fails.

Hubert Buch-Hansen 18. Associate Professor, Department of Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School. “The Prerequisites for a Degrowth Paradigm Shift: Insights from Critical Political Economy.” *Ecological Economics* 146: 157-63. Emory Libraries.

Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required. It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97). While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an antimarket project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power. Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23). In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project. The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989). 6. Consent It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project. Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense. Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this. At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

#### Scenario 2 is Innovation----

#### Increased competition aligns innovation with profit motive and drives technological breakthroughs in every sector of the economy.

Giulio Federico 20. Head of the Unit at the Chief Economist Team (CET) of DG Competition, European Commission, et al., 2020. “Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption.” https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Shapiro-Carl-Antitrust-and-Innovation-Welcoming-and-Protecting-Disruption.pdf.

The goal of antitrust policy is to protect and promote a vigorous competitive process. Effective rivalry spurs firms to introduce new and innovative products, as they seek to capture profitable sales from their competitors and to protect their existing sales from future challengers. In this fundamental way, competition promotes innovation. We apply this basic insight to the antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers and of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. A merger between rivals internalizes business-stealing effects arising from their parallel innovation efforts and thus tends to depress innovation incentives. Merger-specific synergies, such as the internalization of involuntary spillovers or an increase in the productivity of R&D, may offset the adverse effect of a merger on innovation. We describe the possible effects of a merger on innovation by developing a taxonomy of cases, with reference to recent US and EU examples. A dominant firm may engage in exclusionary conduct to eliminate the threat from disruptive firms. This suppresses innovation by foreclosing disruptive rivals and by reducing the pressure to innovative on the incumbent. We apply this broad principle to possible exclusionary strategies by dominant firms. I. Introduction We write in praise of market disrupters—firms that shake up the status quo, threaten incumbent firms, and sometimes transform entire industries. Through this process, which Joseph Schumpeter famously called “creative destruction,” disruptive firms promote economic growth and bring the benefits of new technologies and new business practices and business models to consumers. We focus on the impact of antitrust policy—known globally as competition policy—on innovation.1 Competition policy seeks to protect and promote a vigorous competitive process by which new ideas are transformed into realized consumer benefits. In this fundamental way, competition spurs innovation. The productivity and growth literature teach us that innovation is the primary driver of rising standards of living over time, so promoting innovation through effective competition policy is likely to be very consequential for economic growth and welfare. Disruptive firms drive a significant amount of innovation.2 They do not use the same technology or business model as incumbents. They offer consumers a distinct value proposition, not simply lower prices. By making its offer to customers attractive in a new way, a disruptive firm can destroy a great deal of incumbent profit while creating a large amount of consumer surplus. The resulting churn in products and market shares, as new products enter and old ones exit, and as newer business methods and business models supplant older ones, represents a healthy competitive process. If that competitive process is slowed or biased by mergers or by exclusionary conduct, innovation is lessened and consumers are harmed. This same competitive process promotes the development and diffusion of best practices, including what might be termed reductions in X-inefficiency. The trade and productivity literature both convincingly demonstrate that firms vary significantly in their productivity levels and that stiffer competition reallocates sales to more productive firms. The diffusion of best practices also is promoted if sales are contestable, going to the better-performing firms. Competition policy seeks to protect the competitive process by which disruptive firms challenge the status quo. Competition policy is agnostic regarding the type of firm or the type of innovation involved. Start-ups that grow rapidly can certainly be disruptive. Uber and Airbnb are prominent recent examples. But large established firms can also be disruptive, especially when they attack adjacent markets. Think of Walmart entering local retail markets, Microsoft Bing challenging Google in search, or Netflix producing its own video content. In contrast, the role played by successful incumbent firms in their own core markets is deeply conflicted. On the one hand, process innovations that lower costs can be most valuable at the largest firms, and market leaders often invest substantial sums to introduce new generations of products. Examples abound: Intel developing a new generation of technology and building new fabs to manufacture microprocessors; Boeing developing a new generation of large commercial aircraft; and Verizon investing to build its 5G wireless network. In many industries experiencing rapid technological change, the biggest firms are also some of the most impressive innovators, as Schumpeter observed 75 years ago.3 This should not be surprising, given the economies of scale associated with R&D, especially in industries where developing the next-generation product or process requires investments of hundreds of millions of dollars and/or extensive experience with the current technology.4 On the other hand, a successful incumbent firm that is profiting greatly from the status quo has a powerful incentive to preserve those profits, and this can mean slowing down or blocking disruptive threats. Successful incumbents also may find it very difficult organizationally to invest in disruptive technologies. 5 Competition valuably increases the diversity of approaches taken to the development of new technology. We stress in this article that innovation is best promoted when market leaders are allowed to exploit their competitive advantages while also facing pressure to perform coming from both conventional rivals and from disruptive entrants. These labels depend on context: the same firm can be a market leader in one area and a disruptive upstart in another. Market leaders may face competitive pressures to innovate coming from (a) other large firms in the same market, (b) other large firms in adjacent spaces, or (c) smaller, pesky disruptive firms. Casual empiricism indicates that all of these sources of competition are important in different settings. All have historically been protected using competition policy. The central theme animating our analysis is that a market leader is best motivated to innovate if it fears losing its leadership position to a disruptive rival.6 Even a dominant incumbent will feel pressure to innovate if the bulk of tomorrow’s sales will be won by the firm that is most innovative, be that the incumbent or a disruptive challenger, and if other firms are in a position to leapfrog the current incumbent. Once one properly understands the dynamic nature of the competitive process, it becomes clear that greater rivalry—meaning greater contestability of tomorrow’s sales—leads to more innovation.7 The critical role of competition policy is thus to prevent today’s market leaders from using their market power to disable disruptive threats, either by acquiring would-be rivals or by using anticompetitive tactics to exclude them. Sections II and III discuss the treatment of horizontal mergers that may harm innovation. Section IV discusses the antitrust limits on the business conduct of dominant incumbent firms.

#### Expanding antitrust is necessary to sustain creative destruction. Only that preserves innovation leadership.

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The goal underpinning U.S. antitrust law is to promote competition that leads to lower prices and enhanced consumer welfare. For years, antitrust agencies have approached this goal by focusing on short-term, static competition, which emphasizes achieving low prices in the here and now. This narrow focus, however, has resulted in unnecessary conflict between the static competitive analysis deployed by antitrust regulators and the dynamic issues raised by intellectual property. Fortunately, over the last few decades, a growing recognition has emerged among economists that antitrust laws must be recalibrated to preserve the incentive to innovate and promote the U.S. innovation economy. These economists are calling for an antitrust framework that prioritizes dynamic over static competition — placing less weight on market concentration in the assessment of market power and more weight on assessing technological opportunity, innovation-driven competition and appropriate enterprise-level capabilities. At the heart of this movement is the foundational principle, dating back to Joseph Schumpeter and Nobel Laureate economist Robert Solow, that innovation is the main driver of economic growth. Indeed, given the strong economic evidence that innovation drives productivity, sharpens competition and creates new products, a serious consumer-oriented antitrust policy, with an intermediate-to-long-term orientation, necessarily must focus primarily on supporting and advancing innovation. However, although antitrust agencies routinely claim to favor both innovation and competition, this has not always been the case. For instance, during the previous administration, some agency heads unnecessarily generated tension between static competitive analysis — with its undue emphasis on achieving low prices in the short term — and the dynamic issues implicated by intellectual property and associated royalty payments. Royalties, in the short run, raise prices of licensed goods relative to the prices that would prevail absent payments. However, payments to licensors also support innovation by helping innovators achieve the economic returns necessary to draw forth the critical investment dollars needed to support research and development (R&D) and continuing innovation. This model produces a continuous cycle of innovation in which innovators are properly incentivized to invent and reinvest their royalties into more R&D, which leads to new innovations and restarts the cycle. A prime example of the dynamic benefits flowing from such an innovation ecosystem is 5G. This revolutionary technology promises the ability to connect to and control cities, automobiles, objects and devices, transforming a broad range of industries in the process. Thanks to its private-sector top performers, the United States currently leads the world in 5G — a distinction that comes with an extraordinary opportunity for massive economic growth and increased consumer welfare. However, the rigid application of an antitrust framework focused on short-term pricing, rather than on innovation as a critical driver of competition, could cause the United States to forfeit its 5G leadership position. This would not only reduce consumer welfare but would pose a clear risk to U.S. national security — a fact recognized by U.S. national defense agencies in prohibiting a foreign company from acquiring Qualcomm, a U.S. technology company, because the proposed transaction imperiled Qualcomm’s 5G leadership position. Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has indicated that a course correction may be underway. In a series of speeches, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim, head of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, signaled that the focus of a sound antitrust analysis must be less on short-term pricing and more on the innovation and growth that delivers value to consumers over the longer term. For example, in his speech before the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, Delrahim invoked “promoting dynamic competition” as a normative goal of competition regulators. He also declared that “competition law enforcers around the world must give careful consideration to the interests that drive innovation, including by allowing innovators to reap the full rewards of their investment in research and development.” It appears that Delrahim correctly recognizes that innovation is the critical driver of competition.While Delrahim’s leadership on this issue is admirable, officials at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regrettably have yet to follow the DOJ’s lead. The FTC continues to endorse outdated modes of competition regulation and policies that are not properly calibrated to promote dynamic competition and advance innovation. In order to truly enhance consumer welfare over the long term, I hope the FTC soon will join hands with the DOJ and help move the United States toward a pro-innovation policy founded upon a dynamic competition paradigm. For over 30 years, a small group of economists has been calling for a pivot in antitrust in favor of dynamic over static competition. With Delrahim at the helm of the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, we may soon witness such a pivot. U.S. antitrust policy needs to adopt a deeper understanding of innovation processes and competition over the long run, and there needs to be greater policy coherence among antitrust, industrial and technology policies. The dynamic competition paradigm is both the easiest and the best intellectual paradigm for the competition agencies and the courts to employ to free antitrust from its current outmoded framework. Indeed, prioritizing dynamic competition over its weaker sibling will enhance not just consumer welfare, but economic welfare, too.

#### Regulated capitalism is key---alternative systems fail to innovate sufficiently.

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Nonetheless, the abolition of capitalism is not the solution. The last century witnessed a large-scale experiment with an alternative system—a system of central planning in the Soviet Union and other communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This system failed to offer individuals the freedom and economic incentives necessary for frontier innovation, and so these nations were unable to get beyond an intermediate level of development. Henri Weber, a well-known figure of the French movement of May 1968, was a former Trotskyist leader in the 1960s and 1970s but later became a leader of the French Socialist Party and Socialist member of the European Parliament. He explained his personal conversion to the free market economy and social democracy, looking to the Scandinavian experience: “Having witnessed from a front-row seat the disaster of collectivization of agriculture and firms in the Soviet Union, the Scandinavian Socialists were the first to break with the dogma of socializing means of production and managing the economy by a central planning committee. To control and humanize the economy, it is altogether unnecessary to expropriate management, to nationalize firms, or to eradicate the market . . . altogether unnecessary to deprive society of the creativity, knowhow, and dynamism of entrepreneurs. Under certain conditions, entrepreneurial talent can be mobilized to serve the common good.” A market economy, because it induces creative destruction, is inherently disruptive. But historically it has proved to be a formidable engine of prosperity, hoisting our societies to levels of development unimaginable two centuries ago. Must we therefore resign ourselves to the serious pitfalls and defects of capitalism as the necessary price to pay to generate prosperity and overcome poverty? In this book, we have sought to better understand how growth through creative destruction interacts with competition, inequality, the environment, finance, unemployment, health, happiness, and industrialization, and how poor countries catch up to rich ones. We have analyzed to what degree the state, with appropriate control of the executive, can stimulate the creation of wealth while at the same time tackling the problems mentioned above. We have seen how, by moving from laissez-faire capitalism, with market forces given free rein, to a form of capitalism in which the state and civil society play their full role, it is possible to stimulate social mobility and reduce inequality without discouraging innovation. We have also seen how appropriate competition policies can curb the decline of growth and how we can redirect innovation toward green technologies to combat global warming. We have seen that, without forgoing globalization, a country can improve its competitiveness through innovative investments and put in place effective safety nets to protect individuals who lose their jobs. Lastly, we have seen how, with the indispensable support of civil society, it is possible to prevent yesterday’s innovators, in collusion with public officials, from pulling up the ladder behind themselves to block the path of tomorrow’s innovators.

#### Failure to sustain innovation leadership makes a China war inevitable.

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The global economy has become more integrated, with China’s economy growing strongly—poised to soon take over the United States at market exchange rates and having already done so in terms of purchasing power parity. More importantly, China has become the top trading partner and creditor/investor for many countries. The size and penetration of the Chinese economy have rendered a strategy of containing China impractical and costly to all sides, and makes the US-China contention more protracted and difficult.The West thus faces a dilemma: Efforts to decouple from China in order to limit its influence would hurt not only China but also Western countries and the global economy more broadly, but striking a trade deal with China to reduce tensions will likely help the Chinese economy perform better, making the strategic competition with Beijing more intractable.The rivalry has slowly led to a bifurcation of the global economy, most discernible in high-tech areas such as the tension between digital authoritarianism and digital liberalism, artificial intelligence and surveillance technologies, satellite-based navigation for civilian and military uses, and 5G/6G telecommunications.A balanced assessment It’s important to remember that China has many weaknesses, including an aging population with a shrunken labor force, a secular decline in labor productivity, high levels of debt, environmental degradation, and social and economic inequalities. It is still an open question whether China can graduate from its old and trusted development model of mobilizing massive investment for exports to one driven by innovation—a model that tends not to thrive under political control. However, it is equally important not to underestimate the domestic challenges facing the United States and several European countries. Confronted by aging populations and declining productivity, many affluent Western countries have been beset by populist backlashes against economic inequalities and social problems. Especially in the United States, the division has deepened to the extent that there is no shared perception of reality, let alone common ground for debate. This makes it difficult for the United States to build political consensus behind any sustained actions needed to deal with its challenges—even though the country has managed to overcome difficulties in the past and could do so again. With or without the label “cold war,” the United States and China are locked in a protracted conflict over core national values, including economic and geopolitical interests. The fact that the Chinese economy is stronger than the Soviet Union’s decrepit economy, playing a key role in integrated global supply chains, while many Western countries suffer from internal divisions, makes the strategic competition more challenging for the West than the Cold War of the late twentieth century was. Of particular concern is the fact that the United States has suffered a steep fall in its Freedom House “Freedom in the World” score since 2010, denting much of its soft power. Consequently, the contestants in today’s conflict appear to be more evenly matched, making for a difficult struggle ahead—whatever you want to call it.

#### US-China competition isn’t defined by military strength, but relative innovation capacity. Outpacing China is the only way to prevent a war.

James Lewis 18. Senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Technological Competition and China.” <https://www.csis.org/analysis/technological-competition-and-china>.

The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions. The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace. Innovation has become a central element of its international influence. This is not new—the U.S.-Soviet space race was a contest of the ability of different systems to produce new technologies, but those were unique government programs. Technological competition today is as much between companies as states. A country’s ability to innovate and produce advanced technologies provides economic strength, military power, and an intangible benefit of perceived leadership. Both China and the United States have advantages and disadvantages in this contest, and while it is usual to focus on quantitative aspects—such as the number of engineers or patents and spending on research and development (R&D)—these are not the key determinants of technological competition between states. This competition is a contest of ideas on governance for investment, innovation, and the internet. The internet and global connectivity not only reshape the environment for competition but also create political and market forces that both nations find difficult to control.

#### That goes nuclear.

Graham Allison 17. American political scientist and professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?” Scribe Publications Pty Limited.

Two centuries ago, Napoleon warned, "Let China sleep; when she wakes, she will shake the world." Today China has awakened, and the world is beginning to shake. Yet many Americans are still in denial about what China's transfor- mation from agrarian backwater to "the biggest player in the history of the world" means for the United States. What is this book's Big Idea? In a phrase. Thucydidess Trap; When rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound: danger ahead. China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war-unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it. As a rapidly ascending China challenges America's accustomed pre- dominance, these two nations risk falling into a deadly trap first identified the 'ancient' Greek historian Thucydides. Writing about a war that devastated the two leading city-states of classical Greece two and a half. millennia ago, he explained: "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." That primal insight describes :1 perilous historical pattern. Reviewing the record of the past five hundred years, the Thucydides's Trap Project I direct at Harvard has found sixteen cases in which a major nation's rise has disrupted the position of a dominant state. In the most infamous example, an industrial Germany rattled Britain's established position at the top of the pecking order a century ago. The catastrophic outcome of their competition necessitated a new category of violent conflict: world war. Our research finds that twelve of these rivalries ended in war and four did not - not a comforting ratio for the twenty- first century's most important geopolitical contest. This is not a book about China. It is about the *impact* of a rising China on the US and the global order. For seven decades since World War II, a rules-based framework led by Washington has defined world order, producing an era without war among great powers. Most people now think of this as normal. Historians call it a rare "Long Peace." To- day, an increasingly powerful China is unraveling this order, throwing into question the peace generations have taken for granted. In 2015, the Atlantic published "The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for War?" In that essay I argued that this histori- cal metaphor provides the best lens available for illuminating relations between China and the US today. Since then, the concept has ignited considerable debate. Rather than face the evidence and reflect on the uncomfortable but necessary adjustments both sides might make, pol- icy wonlts and presidents alike have constructed a straw man around Thucydides's claim about "inevitability." They have then put a torch to it -arguing that war between Washington and Beijing is not predetermined. At their 2015 summit, Presidents Barack Obama and Xijinping discussed the Trap at length. Obama emphasized that despite the structural stress created by China's rise. "the two countries are capable of managing their disagreements." At the same time, they acknowledged that. in Xi's words. "should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves." I concur: war between the US and China is not inevitable. Indeed, Thucydides would agree that neither was war between Athens and Sparta. Read in context. it is clear that he meant his claim about inevitability as hyperbole: exaggeration for the purpose of emphasis. The point of Thucydides's Trap is neither fatalism nor pessimism. Instead. it points us beyond the headlines and regime rhetoric to recognize the tectonic structural stress that Beijing and Washington must master to construct a peaceful relationship. If Hollywood were making a movie pitting China against the United States on the path to war. central casting could not find two better leading actors than Xi jinping and Donald Trump. Each personifies his country's deep aspirations of national greatness. Much as Xi's appointment as leader (if China in 2012 accentuated the role of the rising power, America': election of Donald Trump in a campaign that vilified China promises a more vigorous response from the ruling power. As personalities, Trump and Xi could not be more different. As protagonists in a struggle to be number one. however, they share por- tentous similarities. Both - Are driven by .1 common ambition: to malte their nation great again. - Identify the nation ruled by the other as the principal obstacle to their dream. - Take pride in their own unique leadership capabilities. ' See themselves playing a central role in revitalizing their nation. ° Have announced daunting domestic agendas that call for radical changes. - Have fired up populist nationalist support to "drain the swamp" of corruption at home and confront attempts by each other to thwart their nation's historic mission. Will the impending clash between these two great nations lead to war? Will Presidents Trump and Xi, or their successors. follow in the tragic footsteps of the leaders of Athens and Sparta or Britain and Ger- many? Or will they find a way to avoid war as effectively as Britain and the US did a century ago or the US and the Soviet Union did through four decades of Cold War? Obviously, no one knows. We can be cer- tain, however, that the dynamic Thucydides identified will intensify in the years ahead. Denying Thucydides’s Trap does not make it less real. Recognizing it does not mean just accepting whatever happens. We owe it to future generations to face one of history’s most brutal tendencies head on and then do everything we can to defy the odds. h, if we only knew." That was the best the Gemian chancellor could offer. Even when a colleague pressed Theobald von Beth- mann Hollweg. he could not explain how his choices. and those of other European statesmen, had led to the most devastating war the world had seen to that point. By the time the slaughter of the Great War finally ended in 1918, the key players had lost all they fought for: the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved. the German kaiser ousted, the Russian tsar overthrown, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of its treasure and youth. And for what? If we only knew. Bethmann Hollweg's phrase haunted the president of the United States nearly half a century later. In 1962.]ohn F. Kennedy was forty- five years old and in his second year in oï¬‚ice, but still struggling to get his mind around his responsibilities commander in chief. He knew that his finger was on the button of a nuclear arsenal that could ltill hundreds of millions of human beings in a matter of minutes. But for what? A slogan at the time declared. "Better dead than red." Kennedy rejected that dichotomy as not just facile, but false. "Our goal," as he put it, had to be "not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom." The question was how he and his administration could achieve both. As he vacationecl at the family compound on Cape Cod in the sum- mer of 1902, Kennedy found himself reading The Gun: q/'August, Bar- bara Tuchman's compelling account of the outbrealt of war in 1914. Tuclnnan traced the thoughts and actions of Germany's Kaiser Wil- helm and his chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Britain's King George and his foreign secretary Edward Grey, Tsar Nicholas, Austro-Hungarian emperor Franz Joseph. and others as they sleepwalked into the abyss. Tuchman argued that none of these men understood the danger they faced. None wanted the war they got. Given the opportunity for a do- -mwm he made. Reflecting on his own responsibilities, Kennedy pledged that if he ever found himself facing his own responsibilities, Kennedy pledged that if ever found himself facing choices that could make the difference between catastrophic war and peace, he would be able to give history a better answer than Bethmann Holloweg’s. Kennedy had no inkling of what lay ahead. In October 1962, just two months after he read Tuchman's book, he faced off against Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the most dangerous confrontation in hu- man history. The Cuban Missile Crisis began when the United States discovered the Soviets attempting to sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba, a mere ninety miles from Florida. The situation quickly esca- lated from diplomatic threats to an American blockade of the island, military mobilizations in both the US and USSR, and several high- stakes clashes. including the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Cuba. At the height of the crisis, which lasted for a tense thirteen days. Kennedy confided to his brother Robert that he believed the chances it would end in nuclear war were "between one-in-three and even." Nothing historians have discovered since has lengthened ' those odds. Although he appreciated the dangers of his predicament. Kennedy repeatedly made choices he knew actually increased the risk of war, in- cluding nuclear war. He chose to confront Khrushchev publicly (rather than my to resolve the issue privately through diplomatic channels); to draw an unambiguous red line requiring the removal of Soviet missiles (rather than leave himself more wiggle room); to threaten air strikes to destroy the missiles (knowing this could trigger Soviet retaliation against Berlin); and finally, on the penultimate day of the crisis. to give Khrushchev a time-limited ultimatum (that. if rejected. would have re- quired the US to fire the first shot). In each of these choices, Kennedy understood that he was raising the risk that further events and choices by others beyond his control could lead to nuclear bombs destroying American cities. including Washing- ton, DC (where his family stayed throughout the ordeal). For example, when Kennedy elevated the alert level of the American nuclear arse- nal to Defcon II. he made US weapons less vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet attack but simultaneously relaxed a score of safety catches. At Defcon ll. German and Turkish pilots took their seats in NATO fighter bombers loaded with armed nuclear weapons less than two hours away from their targets in the Soviet Union. Since electronic locks on nu- clm weapons had not yet been invented, there was no physical or tech- nica barrier preventing a pilot from deciding to ï¬‚y to Moscow, drop a mic ar bomb, and start World War III. ith no way to wish away these "risks of the uncontrollable," Ken- ned ' and his secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, reached deeply into organizational procedures to minimize accidents or mistakes. De- spit those efforts, historians have identified more than a dozen close calls outside Kennedy's span of control that could have sparked a war. A US ntisubmarine campaign, For example, dropped explosives around Soviet submarines to force them to surface, leading a Soviet captain to believe he was under attack and almost fire his nuclear-armed torpe- does. In another incident, the pilot of a U-2 spy craft mistakenly ï¬‚ew over the Soviet Union, causing Khrushchev to fear that Washington was refining coordinates for a preemptive nuclear attack. If one of these actions had sparked a nuclear World War III. could\_]FK explain how his choices contributed to it? Could he give a better answer to an inquisi- tor's question than Bethmann Hollweg did? The complexity of causation in human affairs has vexed philoso- phers, jurists, and social scientists. In analyzing how wars break out, historians focus primarily on proximate or immediate causes. In the case of World War I, these include the assassination of the Hapsburg archduke Franz Ferdinand and the decision by Tsar Nicholas II to mo- bilize Russian forces against the Central Powers. If the Cuban Missile Crisis had resulted in war, the proximate causes could have been the Soviet submarine captain's decision to fire his torpedoes rather than al- low his submarine to sink, or a Turkish pilot's errant choice to fly his nuclear payload to Moscow. Proximate causes for war are undeniably important. But the founder of history believed that the most obvious causes for bloodshed mask even more significant ones. More import- ant than the sparks that lead to war, Thucydides teaches us, are the structural factors that lay its foundations: conditions in which other- wise manageable events can escalate with unforeseeable severity and produce unimaginable consequences. Tl-IUCYDIDES'S TRAP In the most frequently cited one-liner in the study of international re- lations, the ancient Greek historian Thucydides explained, "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war a} . I I .99 Tliucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War, a conflict that en- gulfcd his homeland, the city-state of Athens, in the fifth century BCB, and which in time came to consume almost the entirety of ancient Greece. A former soldier. Thucydides watched as Athens challenged the dominant Greek power of the day, the martial city-state of Sparta. He observed the outbreak of armed hostilities between the two powers and detailed the fighting's horrific toll. He did not live to see its bitter end. when a weakened Sparta finally vanquished Athens. but it is just as well for him. While others identified an array of contributing causes of the Pelo- ponncsian War. Thucydides went to the heart of the matter. When he turned the spotlight on "the rise of Athens and the fear that this in- stilled in Sparta." he identified a primary driver at the root of some of history's most catastrophic and puzzling wars. Intentions aside, when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception. It happened between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century ncia, between Germany and Britain a century ago. and almost led to war between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1950s and 19605. Like so many others. Athens believed its advance to be benign. Over the half century that preceded the conï¬‚ict, it had emerged as a steeple of civilization. Philosophy, drama. architecture, democracy. history, and naval prowess-Athens had it all. beyond anything previously -s'eel'I'Imder the sun. Its rapid development began to threaten Sparta, which had grown accustomed to its position as the dominant power on the Peloponnese. As Athenian confidence and pride grew, so too did its demands for respect and expectations that arrangements be revised to reflect new realities of power. These were, Thucydides tells us, natural reactions to its changing station. How could Athenians not believe that their interests deserved more weight? How could Athenians not expect that they should have greater inï¬‚uence in resolving differences? But it was also natural. Thucydides explained. that Spartans should see the Athenian claims as unreasonable, and even ungrateful. Who, Spartans rightly asked. provided the security environment that allowed Athens to ï¬‚ourish? As Athens swelled with a growing sense of its own importance, and felt entitled to greater say and sway, Sparta reacted with insecurity. fear. and a determination to defend the status quo. Similar dynamics can be found in a host of other settings, indeed even in families. When a young man's adolescent surge poses the prospect that he will overshadow his older sibling (or even his father), what do we expect? Should the allocation of bedrooms. or closet space, or seat- ing be adjusted to reflect relative size as well as age? In alpha-dominated species like gorillas, as a potential successor grows larger and stronger, both the pack leader and the wannabe prepare for a showdown. In businesses, when disruptive technologies allow upstart companies like Apple. Google. or Uber to break quickly into new industries. the re- sult is often a bitter competition that forces established companies like : ifliiexpvlett-Packard, Microsoft. or taxi operators to adapt their business models -or perish. Thucydides's Trap refers to the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. This can happen in any sphere. But its implications are most dangerous in international affairs. For just as the original instance of Thucydides's Trap resulted in a war that brought ancient Greece to its knees, this phenomenon has haunted diplomacy in the millennia since. Today it has set the world's two biggest powers on a path to a cataclysm nobody wants, bud which they may prove unable to avoid. ARE THE US AND CHINA DESTINED FOR WAR? The world has never seen anything like the rapid, tectonic shift in the global balance of power created by the rise of China. If the US were a corporation. it would have accounted for 50 percent of the global eco- nomic market in the years immediately after World War II. By 1980, that had declined to 22 percent. Three decades of double-digit Chi- nese growth has reduced that US share to 16 percent today. If current trends continue, the US share of global economic output will decline further over the next three decades to 'ust ll rcent. Over this same J P' criod, China's share of the global economy will have soared from 2 P 8 Y percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2016, well on its way to 30 percent in 2040. China's economic development is transforming it into a formida- ble political and military competitor. During the Cold War. as the US mounted clumsy responses to Soviet provocations, a sign in the Penta- gon said: "lf we ever faced a real enemy, we would be in deep trouble." China is a serious potential enemy. The possibility that the United States and China could find them- selves at war appears as unlikely as it would be unwise. The centennials recalling World War l, however, have reminded us of man's capacity for folly. When we say that war is "inconceivable." is this a statement about what is possible in the world-or only about what our limited minds can conceive? As far ahead as the eye can see. the defining question about global order is whether China and the US can escape Thucydides's Trap. Most contests that fit this pattern have ended badly. Over the past five hun- drcd years, in sixteen cases a major rising power has threatened to dis- place a ruling power. In twelve of those, the result was war. The four cases that avoided this outcome did so only because of huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of challenger and chal- lenged alilte. The United States and China can likewise avoid war, but only if they can internalize two difficult truths. First. on the current trajectory. war between the US and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than currently recognized. Indeed. on the historical record. war lS IUOT? add to they h tainly major likely than not. By underestimating the danger, moreover, we the risk. If leaders in Beijing and Washington keep doing what ave done for the past decade. the US and China will almost cer- wind up at war. Second, war is not inevitable. History shows that ruling powers can manage relations with rivals. even those that threaten to overtake them, without triggering a war. The record of those successes, as well as the failures. offers many lessons for statesmen today. As George Santayana noted, only those who fail to study history are condemned to repeat it. The chapters that follow describe the origins of Thucydides's Trap, explore its dynamics. and explain its implications for the present con- test between the US and China. Part One provides a succinct summary of the rise of China. Everyone knows about China's growth but few have realized its magnitude or its consequences. To paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel. it has happened so quickly that we have not yet had time to be astonished. Part Two locates recent developments in US-China relations on the broader canvas of history. This not only helps us understand current events. but also provides clues about where events are trending. Our review stretches back 2,500 years, to the time when the rapid growth of Athens shocked a dominant martial Sparta and led to the Pelopon- nesian War. Key examples from the past 500 years also provide insights into the ways in which the tension between rising and ruling powers can tilt the chessboard toward war. The closest analogue to the current standoff--Germany's challenge to Britain's ruling global empire be- fore World War I--should give us all pause. Part Three asks whether we should see current trends in America's relations with China as a gathering storm of similar proportions. Daily media reports of China's "aggressive" behavior and unwillingness to accept the "intemational rules-based order" established by the US af- -!El"W6l'l'd War I] describe incidents and accidents reminiscent of 1914. At the same time. a dose of self-awareness is due. If China were "just lilte us" when the US burst into the twentieth century brimming with confidence that the hundred years ahead would be an American era. the rivalry would be even more severe, and war even harder to avoid. If it actually followed in America's footsteps, we should expect to see Chi- nese troops enforcing Beijing's will from Mongolia to Australia, just as Theodore Roosevelt molded "our hemisphere" to his China is following a different trajectory than did the United States during its own surge to primacy. But in many aspects of China's rise, we can hear echoes. What does President Xi\_|inping's China want? In one line: to make China great again. The deepest aspiration of over a billion Chinese citizens is to make their nation not only rich, but also pow- erful. Indeed, their goal is a China so rich and so powerful that other nations will have no choice but to recognize its interests and give it the respect that it deserves. The sheer scale and ambition of this "China Dream" should disabuse us of any notion that the contest between (jliina and the United States will naturally subside as China becomes a "responsible stakeholder." This is especially so given what my former colleague Sam Huntington famously called a "clash of civilizations," a historical disjunction in which fundamentally different Chinese and American values and traditions make rapprochement between the two powers even more elusive. While resolution of the present rivalry may seem difficult to foresee. actual armed conflict appears distant. But is it? In truth, the paths to war are more varied and plausible (and even mundane) than we want to believe. From current confrontations in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and cyberspace, to a trade conflict that spirals out of control, it is frighteningly easy to develop scenarios in which Ameri- can and Chinese soldiers are killing each other. Though none of these scenarios seem likely, when we recall the unintended consequences of the assassination of the Hapsburg archdulte or of l(hrushchev's nuclear adventure in Cuba, we are reminded of just how narrow the gap is be- tween "unlikely" and "impossible." Part Four explains why war is not inevitable. Most of the policy community and general public are naively complacent about the possi- bility of war. Fatalists. meanwhile, see an irresistible force rapidly ap- proaching an immovable object. Neither side has it right. If leaders in both societies will study the successes and failures of the past, they will find a rich source of clues from which to fashion a strategy that can meet each nation's essential interests without war. The return to prominence of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.4 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a condin'on-a chronic condition that will have to be managed over a generation. Success will require not just a new slogan, more frequent presidential summits. or additional meetings of departmental working groups. Managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention, week by Wcclc. at the highest levels in both governments. It will require a depth of mutual understanding not seen since the Henry Kissinger-Zhou En- lai conversations that reestablished US-China relations in the 19705. Most significant, it will mean more radical changes in attitudes and ac- tions by leaders and the public alilte than anyone has yet undertaken. To escape Thucydides's Trap. we must be willing to think the unthinkable -:md imagine the unimaginable. Avoiding Thucydides's Trap in this case will require nothing less than bending the arc of history.

#### Extinction outweighs.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### The structure of the international system explains conflict.

Michael Beckley 18. Professor of political science at Tufts. *Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower*. Cornell University Press.

The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past ﬁve hundred years when a rising power challenged a ruling power. 3 Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium.

The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conﬂict more likely—but none of these conﬂicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry.

To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identiﬁed by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-ﬁve years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before.

Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths worldwide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars. 4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent. 5 Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined. 6

What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life. 7

Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans suddenly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dramatic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology. 8

The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy ﬁghting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conﬂict. 9 Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than ﬁght to overturn it. 10 As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challengers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions. 11 History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

#### The best studies confirm our impact---err on the side of a consensus of empirical research---our evidence assumes every skeptic.

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Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence— and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them.

This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research.

General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?

Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support:

* Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3
* The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key. 4
* Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies. 5
* Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence. 6
* Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard.

The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances— especially with nuclear- armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer— and protégés to seek— alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy.

More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents.

The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8

Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10

Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are:

* The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11
* Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14
* Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17
* Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16

In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20

The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21

This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23

Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk.

Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25

#### Absent US leadership, China will fill-in the innovation vacuum---that causes an expansion of technology that undermines human rights, expands repression of minorities, and cements dangerous bioethics.

Christopher Darby & Sarah Sewall 21. President and CEO of In-Q-Tel, Executive Vice President for Policy at IQT, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. “America’s Eroding Technological Advantage.” <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-10/technology-innovation-wars>.

Since the early days of the Cold War, the United States has led the world in technology. Over the course of the so-called American century, the country conquered space, spearheaded the Internet, and brought the world the iPhone. In recent years, however, China has undertaken an impressive effort to claim the mantle of technological leadership, investing hundreds of billions of dollars in robotics, artificial intelligence, microelectronics, green energy, and much more. Washington has tended to view Beijing’s massive technology investments primarily in military terms, but defense capabilities are merely one aspect of great-power competition today—little more than table stakes. Beijing is playing a more sophisticated game, using technological innovation as a way of advancing its goals without having to resort to war. Chinese companies are selling 5G wireless infrastructure around the world, harnessing synthetic biology to bolster food supplies, and racing to build smaller and faster microchips, all in a bid to grow China’s power. In the face of China’s technological drive, U.S. policymakers have called for greater government action to protect the United States’ lead. Much of the conventional wisdom is sensible: boost R & D spending, ease visa restrictions and develop more domestic talent, and build new partnerships with industry at home and with friends and allies abroad. But the real problem for the United States is much deeper: a flawed understanding of which technologies matter and of how to foster their development. As national security assumes new dimensions and great-power competition moves into different domains, the government’s thinking and policies have not kept pace. Nor is the private sector on its own likely to meet every technological need that bears on the country’s security. In such an environment, Washington needs to broaden its horizons and support a wider range of technologies. It needs to back not only those technologies that have obvious military applications, such as hypersonic flight, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence, but also those traditionally thought of as civilian in nature, such as microelectronics and biotechnology. Washington also needs to help vital nonmilitary technologies make the transition to commercial success, stepping in with financing where the private sector will not. AMERICA’S INNOVATION CHALLENGE In the early decades of the Cold War, the United States spent billions of dollars dramatically expanding its scientific infrastructure. The Atomic Energy Commission, formed in 1946, assumed responsibility for the wartime labs that had pioneered nuclear weapons, such as the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the headquarters of the Manhattan Project, and went on to fund academic research centers, such as the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The Department of Defense, founded in 1947, was given its own massive research budget, as was the National Science Foundation, established in 1950. After the Soviets launched the Sputnik satellite, in 1957, Washington created the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA, to win the space race, as well as what would become the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was tasked with preventing a future technological surprise. By 1964, research and development accounted for 17 percent of all discretionary federal spending. Partnering closely with academia and companies, the government funded a large variety of basic research—that is, research without a specific end use in mind. The goal was to build a technological foundation, defined primarily as conventional and nuclear defense capabilities, to ensure the country’s security. The research proved astonishingly successful. Government investment spawned cutting-edge capabilities that undergirded the United States’ military superiority, from supersonic jets to nuclear-powered submarines to guided missiles. The private sector, for its part, got to capitalize on the underlying intellectual property, turning capabilities into products and products into companies. GPS-enabled technologies, airbags, lithium batteries, touchscreens, voice recognition—all got their start thanks to government investment. Yet over time, the government lost its lead in innovation. In 1964, the U.S. government was spending 1.86 percent of GDP on R & D, but by 1994, that share had fallen to 0.83 percent. During that same period, U.S. corporate R & D investment as a percentage of GDP nearly doubled. The numbers tell only half the story. Whereas much of the government’s R & D investment was aimed at finding new, game-changing discoveries, corporate R & D was mostly devoted to incremental innovation. The formula for growing revenue, the private sector realized, was to expand on existing products, adding functionality or making something faster, smaller, or more energy efficient. Companies focused on nearer-term technologies with commercial promise, rather than broad areas of inquiry that might take decades to bear fruit. Increasingly, the most innovative R & D was taking place not in the labs of large corporations but at nimbler, privately funded startups, where venture capital investors were willing to tolerate more risk. Modern venture capital firms—partnerships that invest in early-stage companies—first arose in the 1970s, leading to early successes such as Apple and Microsoft, but it wasn’t until the dot-com bubble of the 1990s that this style of investment really took off. If the first phase of R & D outsourcing was from government labs to corporate America, this was the second phase: away from big businesses and toward small startups. Large companies began to spend less on internal R & D and more on what they called “corporate development,” or acquiring smaller, venture-backed companies with promising technologies. The rise of venture capitalism created a great deal of wealth, but it didn’t necessarily further U.S. interests. Venture capital firms were judged by their ability to generate outsize returns within a ten-year window. That made them less interested in things such as microelectronics, a capital-intensive sector where profitability arrives in decades more so than years, and more interested in software companies, which need less capital to get going. The problem is that the companies receiving the most venture capital funding have been less likely to pursue national security priorities. When the American venture capital firm Accel hit the jackpot by investing early in Rovio Entertainment, the Finnish video game company behind the mobile app Angry Birds, it may have been a triumph for the firm, but in no way did it further U.S. interests. Meanwhile, government funding of research continued its decline relative both to GDP and to R & D spending in the private sector. The Department of Defense retained the single biggest pot of federal research funding, but there was less money overall, and it became more dispersed across various agencies and departments, each pursuing its own priorities in the absence of a national strategy. As the best researchers were lured to the private sector, the government’s in-house scientific expertise atrophied. Once close relationships between private companies and Washington also suffered, as the federal government was no longer a major customer for many of the most innovative firms. U.S. agencies were rarely the first to buy advanced technology, and smaller startups generally lacked the lobbyists and lawyers needed to sell it to them anyway. Globalization also drove a wedge between corporations and the government. The American market came to look less dominant in an international context, with the huge Chinese consumer market exerting a particularly powerful pull. Corporations now had to think of how their actions might look to customers outside the United States. Apple, for example, famously refused to unlock iPhones for the FBI, a decision that probably enhanced its brand internationally. Further complicating matters, innovation itself was upending the traditional understanding of national security technology. More and more, technology was becoming “dual use,” meaning that both the civilian and the military sectors relied on it. That created new vulnerabilities, such as concerns about the security of microelectronic supply chains and telecommunications networks. Yet even though civilian technologies were increasingly relevant for national security, the U.S. government wasn’t responsible for them. The private sector was, and it was innovating at a rapid clip with which the government could barely keep pace. Taken together, all these trends have led to a concerning state of affairs: the interests of the private sector and the government are further apart than ever. THE CHINESE JUGGERNAUT The changes in American innovation would matter less if the world had remained unipolar. Instead, they occurred alongside the rise of a geopolitical rival. Over the past two decades, China has evolved from a country that largely steals and imitates technology to one that now also improves and even pioneers it. This is no accident; it is the result of the state’s deliberate, long-term focus. China has invested massively in R & D, with its share of global technology spending growing from under five percent in 2000 to over 23 percent in 2020. If current trends continue, China is expected to overtake the United States in such spending by 2025. Central to China’s drive has been a strategy of “military-civil fusion,” a coordinated effort to ensure cooperation between the private sector and the defense industry. At the national, provincial, and local levels, the state backs the efforts of military organizations, state-owned enterprises, and private companies and entrepreneurs. Support might come in the form of research grants, shared data, government-backed loans, or training programs. It might even be as simple as the provision of land or office space; the government is creating whole new cities dedicated solely to innovation. China’s investment in 5G technology shows how the process works in practice. Equipment for 5G makes up the backbone of a country’s cellular network infrastructure, and the Chinese company Huawei has emerged as a world leader in engineering and selling it—offering high-quality products at a lower price than its Finnish and South Korean competitors. The company has been buoyed by massive state support—by The Wall Street Journal’s count, some $75 billion in tax breaks, grants, loans, and discounts on land. Huawei has also benefited from China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which provides generous loans to countries and Chinese companies to finance infrastructure construction. Massive state investments in artificial intelligence have also paid off. Chinese researchers now publish more scientific papers in that field than American ones do. Part of this success is the result of funding, but something else plays a big role: access to enormous amounts of data. Beijing has fueled the rise of powerhouse companies that sweep up endless information about their users. These include Alibaba, an e-commerce giant; Tencent, which developed the all-purpose WeChat app; Baidu, which began as a search engine but now offers a range of online products; DJI, which dominates the consumer drone market; and SenseTime, which provides facial recognition technology for China’s video surveillance network and is said to be the world’s most valuable artificial intelligence company. As a matter of law, these companies are required to cooperate with the state for intelligence purposes, a broad mandate that is almost certainly used to force companies to share data for many other reasons. That information increasingly involves people living outside China. Chinese companies have woven a global web of data-gathering apps that collect foreigners’ private information about their finances, their search history, their location, and more. Those who make a mobile payment through a Chinese app, for example, could have their personal data routed through Shanghai and added to China’s growing trove of knowledge about foreign nationals. Such information no doubt makes it easier for the Chinese government to track, say, an indebted Western bureaucrat who could be convinced to spy for Beijing or a Tibetan activist who has taken refuge abroad. China’s hunger for data extends to some of the most personal information imaginable: our own DNA. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, BGI—a Chinese genome-sequencing company that began as a government-funded research group—has broken ground on some 50 new laboratories abroad designed to help governments test for the virus. China has legitimate reasons to build these labs, but it also has an ugly record of forcibly collecting DNA data from Tibetans and Uighurs as part of its efforts to monitor these minorities. Given that BGI runs China’s national library of genomics data, it is conceivable that through BGI testing, foreigners’ biological data might end up in that repository. Indeed, China has shown great interest in biotechnology, even if it has yet to catch up to the United States. Combined with massive computing power and artificial intelligence, innovations in biotechnology could help solve some of humanity’s most vexing challenges, from disease and famine to energy production and climate change. Researchers have mastered the gene-editing tool CRISPR, allowing them to grow wheat that resists disease, and have managed to encode video in the DNA of bacteria, raising the possibility of a new, cost-effective method of data storage. Specialists in synthetic biology have invented a new way of producing nylon—with genetically engineered microorganisms instead of petrochemicals. The economic implications of the coming biotechnology revolution are staggering: the McKinsey Global Institute has estimated the value of biotechnology’s many potential applications at up to $4 trillion over the next ten to 20 years. Like all powerful technologies, however, biotechnology has a dark side. It is not inconceivable, for example, that some malicious actor could create a biological weapon that targeted a specific ethnic group. On controversial questions—such as how much manipulation of the human genome is acceptable—countries will accept different degrees of risk in the name of progress and take different ethical positions. The country that leads biotechnology’s development will be the one that most profoundly shapes the norms and standards around its use. And there is reason to worry if that country is China. In 2018, the Chinese scientist He Jiankui genetically engineered the DNA of twin babies, prompting an international uproar. Beijing portrayed him as a rogue researcher and punished him. Yet the Chinese government’s disdain for human rights, coupled with its quest for technological supremacy, suggests that it could embrace a lax, even dangerous approach to bioethics. THINKING BIGGER Washington has monitored China’s technological progress through a military lens, worrying about how it contributes to Chinese defense capabilities. But the challenge is much broader. China’s push for technological supremacy is not simply aimed at gaining a battlefield advantage; Beijing is changing the battlefield itself. Although commercial technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology will undoubtedly have military applications, China envisions a world of great-power competition in which no shots need to be fired. Technological supremacy promises the ability to dominate the civilian infrastructure on which others depend, providing enormous influence. That is a major motivation behind Beijing’s support for high-tech civilian infrastructure exports. The countries buying Chinese systems may think they are merely receiving electric grids, health-care technology, or online payment systems, but in reality, they may also be placing critical national infrastructure and citizens’ data in Beijing’s hands. Such exports are China’s Trojan horse. Despite the changing nature of geopolitical competition, the United States still tends to equate security with traditional defense capabilities. Consider microelectronics. They are critical components not only for a range of commercial products but also for virtually every major defense system, from aircraft to warships. Because they will power advances in artificial intelligence, they will also shape the United States’ future economic competitiveness. Yet investment in microelectronics has fallen through the cracks. Neither the private sector nor the government is adequately funding innovation—the former due to the large capital requirements and long time horizons involved and the latter because it has focused more on securing current supplies than on innovating. Although China has had a hard time catching up to the United States in this area, it is only a matter of time before it moves up the microelectronics value chain. Another casualty of the United States’ overly narrow conception of security and innovation is 5G technology. By dominating this market, China has built a global telecommunications network that can serve geopolitical purposes. One fear is that Beijing could help itself to data running on 5G networks. Another is the possibility that China might sabotage or disrupt adversaries’ communications networks in a crisis. Most U.S. policymakers failed to predict the threat posed by Chinese 5G infrastructure. It wasn’t until 2019 that Washington sounded the alarm about Huawei, but by then, there was little it could do. U.S. companies had never offered an end-to-end wireless network, instead focusing on manufacturing individual components, such as handsets and routers. Nor had any developed its own radio access network, a system for sending signals across network devices that is needed to build an end-to-end 5G system like that offered by Huawei and a few other companies. As a result, the United States found itself in an absurd situation: threatening to end intelligence cooperation if close allies adopted Huawei’s 5G technology without having an attractive alternative to offer. Digital infrastructure may be today’s battle, but biotechnology will likely be the next. Unfortunately, it, too, is not considered a priority within the U.S. government. The Department of Defense has understandably shown little interest in it. Part of the explanation for that lies in the fact that the United States, like many other countries, has signed a treaty renouncing biological weapons. Still, biotechnology has other implications for the Pentagon, from changing manufacturing to improving the health of service personnel. More important, any comprehensive assessment of the national interest must recognize biotechnology’s implications for ethics, the economy, health, and planetary survival. Because so many of the gaps in U.S. innovation can be traced back to a narrow view of the national interest and which technologies are needed to support it, the Biden administration’s first step should be to expand that understanding. Officials need to appreciate both the threats and the opportunities of the latest technologies: the havoc that could be wreaked by a paralyzed 5G network or unscrupulous genetic engineering, as well as the benefits that could come from sustainable energy sources and better and more efficient health care. The Biden administration’s second step should be to create a process for aligning government investments with national priorities. Today, federal funding is skewed toward military capabilities. This reflects a political reality: the Pentagon is the rare part of the government that reliably receives bipartisan budgetary support. Fighter jets and missile defense, for example, are well funded, whereas pandemic preparedness and clean energy get short shrift. But setting the right national technological priorities raises questions that can be answered only by making judgments about the full range of national needs. What are the most important problems that technology can help solve? Which technologies have the power to solve only one problem, and which might solve multiple problems? Getting the answers to such questions right requires taking a truly national perspective. The current method doesn’t do so. A properly run process would begin with what national security professionals call a “net assessment”—in this case, an analysis of the state of global technological progress and market trends to give policymakers the information necessary to work from a shared baseline. To be actionable, the process would establish a handful of near- and long-term priorities. A compelling candidate for long-term investment, for instance, might be microelectronics, which are foundations for both military and civilian innovation but have difficulty attracting private investment dollars. Another long-term priority might be biotechnology, given its importance for the economy and the future of humanity. As for short-term priorities, the U.S. government might consider launching an international effort to combat disinformation operations or to promote 5G innovation. Whatever the specific priorities chosen, the important thing is that they be deliberate and clear, guiding the United States’ decisions and signaling its aspirations. A MARKET MINDSET Supporting those priorities is another matter altogether. The current approach—with the government funding only limited research and the private sector taking care of commercializing the results—isn’t working. Too much government-funded research remains locked in the lab, unable to make the leap to commercial viability. Worse, when it manages to leave U.S. government labs, it often ends up in foreign hands, depriving the United States of taxpayer-financed intellectual property. The U.S. government will need to take a more active role in helping research make it to the market. Many universities have created offices that focus on commercializing academic research, but most federal research institutions have not. That must change. In the same spirit, the U.S. government should develop so-called sandboxes—public-private research facilities where industry, the academy, and the government can work together. In 2014, Congress did just that when it established Manufacturing USA, a network of facilities that conduct research into advanced manufacturing technologies. A similar initiative for microelectronics has been proposed, and there is no reason not to create additional sandboxes in other areas, too. The U.S. government could also help with commercialization by building national data sets for research purposes, along with improved privacy protections to reassure the people whose information ends up in them. Such data sets would be particularly useful in accelerating progress in the field of artificial intelligence, which feeds off massive quantities of data—something that only the government and a handful of big technology companies currently possess. Success in synthetic biology, along with wider medical research, will also depend on data. Thus, the U.S. government should increase the quantity and diversity of the data in the National Institutes of Health’s genome library and curate and label that information so that it can be used more easily. All this help with commercialization will be for naught, however, if the startups with the most promising technologies for national security cannot attract enough capital. Some of them run into difficulties at the early and late stages of growth: in the beginning, they have a hard time courting investors willing to make high-risk bets, and later on, when they are ready to expand, they find it difficult to attract investors willing to write large checks. To fill the gaps at both stages, the U.S. government needs its own investment vehicles. We work at the parent company of In-Q-Tel, which offers a promising model for early-stage investment. Created in 1999 by the CIA, In-Q-Tel is an independent, not-for-profit firm that invests in technology startups that serve the national interest. (One early recipient of In-Q-Tel’s investment was Keyhole, which became the platform for Google Earth.) Now also funded by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other U.S. agencies, In-Q-Tel identifies and adapts innovative technologies for its government customers. Compared with a federal agency, a private, not-for-profit firm can more easily attract the investment and technology talent required to make informed investments. There is every reason to take this model and apply it to broader priorities. Even just $100 million to $500 million of early-stage funding per year—a drop in the bucket of the federal budget—could help fill the gap between what the private sector is providing and what the nation needs. For the later stage, policymakers could draw inspiration from the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, the federal agency responsible for investing in development projects abroad, which in 2018 was first authorized to make equity investments. A late-stage investment fund could be structured as an arm of that agency or as a fully independent, not-for-profit private entity funded by the government. Either way, it would provide badly needed capital to companies ready to scale up their operations. Compared with early-stage government support, late-stage government support would have to be greater, in the range of $1 billion to $5 billion annually. To expand the impact of this government investment, both the early- and the late-stage funds should encourage “sidecar” investments, which would allow profit-seeking firms and individuals to join the government in making, and potentially profiting from, technology bets. Government-sponsored investment funds like these would not only fill critical gaps in private-sector investment; they would also allow taxpayers to share in the success of research their money has funded. Currently, most government funding for technology comes in the form of grants, such as the Small Business Innovation Research grants administered by the Small Business Administration; this is true even of some programs that are billed as investment funds. This means that taxpayers foot the bill for failures but cannot share in the success if a company makes it big. As the economist Mariana Mazzucato has pointed out in these pages, “governments have socialized risks but privatized rewards.” Not-for-profit investment vehicles working on behalf of the government would have another benefit: they would allow the United States to play offense when it comes to technological competition. For too long, it has played defense. For example, it has banned the export of sensitive technology and restricted foreign investment that might pose a national security risk—even though these actions can harm U.S. businesses and do nothing to promote innovation. Supporting commercialization with government-sponsored equity investment will not be cheap, but some of the upfront costs would likely be regained and could be reinvested. There are also nonmonetary returns: investing in national priorities, including infrastructure that could be exported to U.S. allies, would enhance the United States’ soft power. INNOVATION EVER AFTER President Joe Biden has pledged to “build back better” and restore the United States’ global leadership. On the campaign trial, he laid out promising proposals to promote American innovation. He called for dramatically boosting federal R & D spending, including some $300 billion to be focused on breakthrough technologies to enhance U.S. competitiveness. That is a good start, but he could make this drive far more effective if he first created a rigorous process for identifying top technological priorities. Biden said he supports “a scaled-up version” of the Small Business Innovation Research grants and has backed “infrastructure for educational institutions and partners to expand research.” Even greater opportunity lies in filling the gaps in private-sector investment and undertaking a long-overdue expansion of government support for commercialization. On innovation, if the United States opts for just more of the same, its economy, its security, and its citizens’ well-being will all suffer. The United States will thus further the end of its global leadership and the unfettered rise of China. Biden has the right instincts. Yet in order to sustain its technological dominance, the country will have to fundamentally reenvision the why and how of innovation. Biden will no doubt be consumed with addressing domestic challenges, but he has spent much of his career promoting the United States’ global leadership. By revamping American technological innovation, he could do both.

#### Failure to stop China allows them to establish a global dystopian surveillance state. Only Western democracies have self-correcting protections to safeguard citizens from over-stretch.

Charlie Campbell 19. East Asia Correspondent for TIME. "The Entire System Is Designed to Suppress Us': What the Chinese Surveillance State Means for the Rest of the World." https://time.com/5735411/china-surveillance-privacy-issues/.

Still, the risks are considerable. As Western democracies enact safeguards to protect citizens from the rampant harvesting of data by government and corporations, China is exporting its AI-powered surveillance technology to authoritarian governments around the world. Chinese firms are providing high-tech surveillance tools to at least 18 nations from Venezuela to Zimbabwe, according to a 2018 report by Freedom House. China is a battleground where the modern surveillance state has reached a nadir, prompting censure from governments and institutions around the globe, but it is also where rebellion against its overreach is being most ferociously fought. “Today’s economic business models all encourage people to share data,” says Lokman Tsui, a privacy expert at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. In China, he adds, we are seeing “what happens when the state goes after that data to exploit and weaponize it.” Some 1,500 miles northwest of where Mrs. Chen recovered her purse, surveillance in China’s restive region of Xinjiang has helped put an estimated 1 million people into “re-education centers” akin to concentration camps, according to the U.N. Many were arrested, tried and convicted by computer algorithm based on data harvested by the cameras that stud every 20 steps in some parts. In the name of fighting terrorism, members of predominantly Muslim ethnic groups—mostly Uighurs but also Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz—are forced to surrender biometric data like photos, fingerprints, DNA, blood and voice samples. Police are armed with a smartphone app that then automatically flags certain behaviors, according to reverse engineering by the advocacy group Human Rights Watch. Those who grow a beard, leave their house via a back door or visit the mosque often are red-flagged by the system and interrogated. Sarsenbek Akaruli, 45, a veterinarian and trader from the Xinjiang city of Ili, was arrested on Nov. 2, 2017, and remains in a detention camp after police found the banned messaging app WhatsApp on his cell phone, according to his wife Gulnur Kosdaulet. A citizen of neighboring Kazakhstan, she has traveled to Xinjiang four times to search for him but found even friends in the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reluctant to help. “Nobody wanted to risk being recorded on security cameras talking to me in case they ended up in the camps themselves,” she tells TIME. Surveillance governs all aspects of camp life. Bakitali Nur, 47, a fruit and vegetable exporter in the Xinjiang town of Khorgos, was arrested after authorities became suspicious of his frequent business trips abroad. The father of three says he spent a year in a single room with seven other inmates, all clad in blue jumpsuits, forced to sit still on plastic stools for 17 hours straight as four HikVision cameras recorded every move. “Anyone caught talking or moving was forced into stress positions for hours at a time,” he says. Bakitali was released only after he developed a chronic illness. But his surveillance hell continued over five months of virtual house arrest, which is common for former detainees. He was forbidden from traveling outside his village without permission, and a CCTV camera was installed opposite his home. Every time he approached the front door, a policeman would call to ask where he was going. He had to report to the local government office every day to undergo “political education” and write a self-criticism detailing his previous day’s activities. Unable to travel for work, former detainees like Bakitali are often obliged to toil at government factories for wages as miserly as 35¢ per day, according to former workers interviewed by TIME. “The entire system is designed to suppress us,” Bakitali says in Almaty, Kazakhstan, where he escaped in May. The result is dystopian. When every aspect of life is under constant scrutiny, it’s not just “bad” behavior that must be avoided. Muslims in Xinjiang are under constant pressure to act in a manner that the CCP would approve. While posting controversial material online is clearly reckless, not using social media at all could also be considered suspicious, so Muslims share glowing news about the country and party as a means of defense. Homes and businesses now feel obliged to display a photograph of China’s President Xi Jinping in a manner redolent of North Koreans’ public displays for founder Kim Il Sung. Asked why he had a picture of Xi in his taxi, one Uighur driver replied nervously, “It’s the law.” Besides the surveillance cameras, people are required to register their ID numbers for activities as mundane as renting a karaoke booth. Muslims are forced from buses to have their IDs checked while ethnic Han Chinese passengers wait in their seats. At intersections, drivers are ushered from their vehicles by armed police and through Tera-Snap “revolving body detector” equipment. In the southern Xinjiang oasis town of Hotan, a facial–recognition booth is even installed at the local produce market. When a system struggled to compute the face of this Western TIME reporter, the impatient Han women queuing behind berated the operator, “Hurry up, he’s not a Uighur, let him through.” China strenuously denies human-rights abuses in Xinjiang, justifying its surveillance leviathan as battling the “three evils” of “separatism, terrorism and extremism.” But the situation has been described as a “horrific campaign of repression” by the U.S. and condemned by the U.N. Washington has also started sanctioning companies like HikVision whose facial–recognition technology is ubiquitous across the Alaska-size region. But Western aversion to surveillance is much broader and stems in no small part from abuses like the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica scandal, in which the “scraped” personal information of up to 87 million people was acquired by the political consultancy to swing elections around the world. China is also rolling out Big Data and surveillance to inculcate “positive” behavior in its citizens via a Social Credit system. In China’s eastern coastal city of Rongcheng, home to 670,000 people, every person is automatically given 1,000 points. Fighting with neighbors will cost you 5 points; fail to clean up after your dog and you lose 10. Donating blood gains 5. Fall below a certain threshold and it’s impossible to get a loan or book high-speed train tickets. Some Chinese see the benefit. High school teacher Zhu Junfang, 42, enjoys perks such as discounted heating bills and improved health care after a series of good works. “Because of the Social Credit system, vehicles politely let pedestrians cross the street, and during a recent blizzard people volunteered to clear the snow to earn extra points,” she says. Such intrusive government is anathema to most in the West, where aversion to surveillance is much broader and more visceral. Whether it’s our Internet browser history, selfies uploaded to social media, data scavenged from fitness trackers or smart-home devices possibly recording the most intimate bedroom conversations, we are all living in what’s been dubbed a “surveillance economy.” In her book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, Shoshana Zuboff describes this as “human experience [broken down into data] as free raw material for commercial practices of extraction, prediction, and sales.” When it comes to facial recognition, resistance is intense given the huge potential for indiscriminate data harvesting. The E.U. is reviewing regulations to give its citizens explicit rights over use of their facial-recognition data. While tech giants Microsoft and Amazon have already deployed the technology, they are also calling for clear legal parameters to govern its use. Other than privacy, there are equality issues too. According to a study by MIT Media Lab, facial-recognition software correctly identified white men 99% to 100% of the time, but that dipped as low as 65% for women of color. Civil-liberties groups are especially uneasy since facial recognition, despite its widespread use by American police, is rarely cited as evidence in subsequent court filings. In May, San Francisco became the first major U.S. city to block police from using facial–recognition software. Even in China, where civil liberties have long been sacrificed for what the CCP deems the greater good, privacy concerns are bubbling up. On Oct. 28, a professor in eastern China sued Hangzhou Safari Park for “violating consumer privacy law by compulsorily collecting visitors’ individual characteristics,” after the park announced its intention to adopt facial–recognition entry gates. In Chongqing, a move to install surveillance cameras in 15,000 licensed taxicabs has met a backlash from drivers. “Now I can’t cuddle my girlfriend off duty or curse my bosses,” one driver grumbles to TIME. Russia’s election meddling around the world highlights the risks of commercially harvested data being repurposed for nefarious goals. It’s a message taken to heart in Hong Kong, where millions have protested over the past five months to push for more democracy. These demonstrators have found themselves in the crosshairs after being identified via CCTV cameras or social media. Employees for state airline Cathay Pacific have been fired and others investigated based on evidence reportedly gleaned via online posts and private messaging apps. This has led demonstrators to adopt intricate tactics to evade Big Brother’s all-seeing eye. Clad in helmets, face masks and reflective goggles, they prepare for confrontations with the police with military precision. A vanguard clutch umbrellas aloft to shield their activities from prying eyes, before a second wave advances to attack overhead cameras with tape, spray paint and buzz saws. From behind, a covering fire of laser pointers attempts to disrupt the recordings of security officers’ body-mounted cameras. Fending off the cameras is just one response. When Matthew, 22, who used only his first name for his own safety, heads to the front lines, he always leaves his regular cell phone at home and takes a burner. Aside from swapping SIM cards, he rarely reuses handsets multiple times since each has a unique International Mobile Equipment Identity digital serial number that he says police can trace. He also switches among different VPNs—software to mask a user’s location—and pays for protest–related purchases with cash or untraceable top-up credit cards. Voice calls are made only as a last resort, he says. “Once I had no choice but to make a call, but I threw away my SIM immediately afterward.” The Hong Kong government denies its smart cameras and lampposts use facial-recognition technology. But “it really comes down to whether you trust institutions,” says privacy expert Tsui. For Matthew, the risks are real and stark: “We are fighting to stop Hong Kong becoming another Xinjiang.” Ultimately, even protesters’ forensic safeguards may not be enough as technology advances. In his Beijing headquarters, Huang Yongzhen, CEO of AI firm Watrix, shows off his latest gait-recognition software, which can identify people from 50 meters away by analyzing thousands of metrics about their walk—even with faces covered or backs to the camera. It’s already been rolled out by security services across China, he says, though he’s ambivalent about privacy concerns. “From our perspective, we just provide the technology,” he says. “As for how it’s used, like all high tech, it may be a double-edged sword.” Little wonder a backlash against AI-powered surveillance is gathering pace. In the U.S., legislation was introduced in Congress in July that would prohibit the use of facial recognition in public housing. Japanese scientists have produced special glasses designed to fool the technology. Public campaigns have railed against commercial uses—from Ticket-master using facial recognition for concert tickets to JetBlue for boarding passes. In May, Democratic Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio–Cortez linked the technology to “a global rise in authoritarianism and fascism.”

#### Death is the ultimate evil

Craig **PATERSON 3**. Director and Consultant, Bioethics World; Professor of Philosophy, Providence College. “A Life Not Worth Living?” *Studies in Christian Ethics* 16: 1-20. Emory Libraries.

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alternative of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it **ontologically destroys the current existent subject** — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes. 80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is **destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are**. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an **objective evil for the person**. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life. 81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself **cannot** therefore **be warranted** since it is an expression of an **ultimate disvalue for the subject**, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.

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#### Cognitive bias is real.

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But as has been said before, Americans are serial amnesiacs. And today, after nearly seventy-five years of great-power peace and thirty years of post–Cold War primacy, Americans are losing their sense of tragedy. **The U.S.-led international order has been so successful, for so long, that Americans have come to take it for granted.** They have forgotten what that order is meant to prevent in the first place: the sort of descent into **violence and great-power war** that has been all too common throughout human history. They are thus **at risk of undermining** the painstaking geopolitical exertions—the costly, frustrating, and seemingly perpetual application of American power—that have **underpinned global peace and security for generations.** This amnesia has become most pronounced, ironically, as U.S. power and the international order are coming under **graver threat than at any time in recent memory. Revisionist states are probing aggressively for weakness**; democracy is in retreat as authoritarianism again advances; instability and upheaval have reached alarming levels; the global balance of power and **resolve is gradually shifting in ominous ways.** The United States and the world it created are once again courting tragedy, **not least because Americans are losing their ability to imagine what tragedy really is.** **It does not have to be this way.** The United States and its allies are not passive observers of their fate. They have the **ability to counter the alarming global trends at work**, so long as they can get their act together. Here history can help. A great virtue of history is that it offers vicarious experience—it provides wisdom and insight without the pain that is often the price of accumulating them. The purpose of this book is to use history to help Americans and other supporters of the U.S.-led international order rediscover their sense of tragedy before they have to experience it themselves. The starting point for that endeavor is an exploration of what tragedy meant to the people who invented it, more than two thousand years ago.

#### Ongoing political project has a narrative deficit – “incommensurability” frame makes indigenous liberation impossible by setting terms of victory as all-or-nothing – reifies acquiescence to subtler settler power

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The prescription for decolonisation—that is, a normative project committed to the liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed one of the most counterhegemonic implications of the settler colonial paradigm as applied to IsraelPalestine, potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’ (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). What, however, does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), there is nevertheless a ‘narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective of the paradigm in many ways closes down possibilities of imagining the type of social and political transformation to which the notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (if not tautological discrepancy) in settler colonial studies, where the only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm renders largely unachievable, if not impossible.

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The structuralism of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and refusal, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. Yet, in seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context. It thus hurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends. There is thus a powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, where there is such thing as a ‘settler will’ that inherently desires the elimination of the native and the distinction between the settler and native can only ever be categorical, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between settler, who seeks to destroy and replace the native, and native, who can only ever push back. Indeed, if the settler colonial paradigm views history in similar teleological terms to the Marxist framework, it does not offer the same hopeful vision of a liberated future. After all, settler colonialism has only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes,

under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7).

The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility of a genuinely decolonised relationship’ (by virtue of its lopsidedness) yet is a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, the categorical distinction produced by the frontier must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’.

Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). Given the generally dreadful Fourth World circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples in settler societies, it could be argued that there is good reason for such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless, the fatalism of the settler colonial paradigm—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—has seen it come under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s ontology erase contingency, heterogeneity and (crucially) agency (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), but its polarised framework effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that the totalising logic of Wolfe’s structure of invasion rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option, but, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, opposition in itself is not decolonisation.

#### Reforms and the state are good

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Political participation is the third element in this account of reconciliation for historical wrongs in settler societies. Its importance stems from the limitations of material and symbolic recognition. Without adequate political agency, economic assistance policies may reinforce damaging stereotypes of laziness and dependence on the state’s coffers, while symbolic recognition efforts for their part may pre-emptively limit difficult debates over the distribution of power by redirecting public attention towards questions that are more politically palatable, such as an official expression of remorse for past harms. These limitations of symbolic and material recognition underscore how reconciliation also requires securing political voice for marginalized groups. This final element involves ensuring formal access to and actual participation in political governance and decisionmaking institutions. The nature of political participation undoubtedly will vary across and within postcolonial settler cases and depend on the legacy of violence and types of groups affected. A variety of institutional responses may be appropriate. At the most basic level, this consists of securing standard political and civil rights, including the rights to assemble, vote and run for office. It will also likely include devolving some—perhaps extensive—political power to indigenous communities, in order to ensure their own substantive political agency and control. This requires indigenous governing authority to “make core decisions about resources, policy, and institutions” through “institutions and activities” that are rooted in Native cultures, rather than wholly dictated from without (Taylor, 2008: 3, 4). Thus, political participation is not merely the formal right to vote; there must be real opportunities to exercise political power. In the wake of significant Indian political activism and civil disobedience campaigns of the 1960s through the 1980s, including the so-called Red Power occupation of Alcatraz prison by the Indians of All Tribes organization, the federal government adopted a policy of “self-determination” for Native American tribes through a variety of laws, such as the Indian Self-Determination Act and its subsequent amendments. And yet the shift to self-determination was hardly transformative: it consisted of transferring the administration of social and economic policies from federal to tribal bureaucracies, but gave relatively little independent political decision-making power to tribal governance entities (Esber, 1992; Getches, 2001). The self-determination and sovereignty powers of indigenous groups have continued to remain highly curtailed and in some cases have regressed: Native American nations are still “domestic dependent nations” under national trusteeship (Wilkins and Stark, 2011: 47). These limitations have nevertheless catalyzed the creation of new indigenous social movements and reinvigorated older ones. Many of these movements have launched campaigns for greater selfdetermination, more robust sovereignty rights vis-à-vis federal and state governments, and extended political authority over natural resources on tribal lands. For instance, the Native American Rights Fund and the Indian Defense League of America have worked to expand tribal treaty rights and sovereignty claims against federal and state governments, while the National Congress of American Indians—an umbrella organization for indigenous tribes across the country—advocates for territorial autonomy and the active protection of indigenous cultures. Somewhat more radical groups, such as the National Indian Youth Council and the American Indian Movement,6 have carried out a variety of voting rights and direct action programs over the years. There is enormous variety in the strategies and specific goals of these and similar organizations, but an overarching aim is to expand the ability of indigenous groups to rule themselves democratically, while simultaneously participating actively in the political life of the country. The very terms of Native American citizenship—which simultaneously includes legal membership in the United States as well as in specific indigenous tribes—highlight the complexity of achieving this. Indeed, greater political participation, and the questions of autonomy and power it raises, may ultimately raise “fundamental challenges to the conventions and tacit assumptions that underpin the governance of white-settler dominions” (Fleras, 1999: 188). Certainly, indigenous self-rule also requires accountability mechanisms to prevent internal corruption and paternalism, which have sometimes proven to be serious. Nevertheless, recent comparative research suggests that increased autonomy exercised through democratic indigenous institutions is strongly correlated with material and cultural well-being as well as political efficacy (Cornell, 2006). Political participation is at its core about the autonomous exercise of political power in the present and future. Without robust participation, efforts to address entrenched legacies of injustice only reproduce the conditions of dependence at the heart of settler colonialism. As Cornell and Kalt (2007) find, indigenous political power is one of the central determinants for escaping poverty. But participation is also crucial to reconciliation, for it contributes to ensuring that indigenous peoples have control over their own lives as well as are active members in national political life.

#### paternalism da

Lightfoot, 20—associate professor in First Nations and Indigenous Studies and the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Ojibwe (Sheryl, “The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” *Pessimism in International Relations*, Chapter 9, pp 162-170, SpringerLink, dml)

Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unifed in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control. In 2005’s Wasase, Alfred presents the state as unitary, intentional and unchanging in its desire to colonise and oppress Indigenous peoples noting, ‘I think that the only thing that has changed since our ancestors first declared war on the invaders is that some of us have lost heart’.22 Referring to current state policies as a ‘self-termination movement’, Alfred states, ‘It is senseless to advocate for an accord with imperialism while there is a steady and intense ongoing attack by the Settler society on everything meaningful to us: our cultures, our communities, and our deep attachments to land’.23 Alfred’s Peace, Power, Righteousness (2009) also argues that the state is deliberate and unchanging, stating quite plainly that ‘it is still the objective of the Canadian and US governments to remove Indians, or, failing that, to prevent them from benefitting, from their ancestral territories’.24 Contemporary states do this, he argues, not through outright violent control but ‘by insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream’.25 According to Alfred, the state ‘relegates indigenous peoples’ rights to the past, and constrains the development of their societies by allowing only those activities that support its own necessary illusion: that indigenous peoples today do not present a serious challenge to its legitimacy’.26 Linking back to the aim of co-option, Alfred argues that while the state’s desire to control Indigenous peoples and lands has never changed, the techniques for doing so have become subtler over time. ‘Recognizing the power of the indigenous challenge and unable to deny it a voice’, due to successful Indigenous resistance over the years, ‘the state has (now) attempted to pull indigenous people closer to it’.27 According to Alfred, the state has outwitted Indigenous leaders and ‘encouraged them to reframe and moderate their nationhood demands to accept the fait accompli of colonization, (and) to collaborate in the development of a “solution” that does not challenge the fundamental imperial lie’.28 In a similar vein, Coulthard’s central argument is centred on his understanding of the dual structure of colonialism. Drawing directly from Fanon, Coulthard finds that colonialism relies on both objective and subjective elements. The objective components involve domination through the political, economic and legal structures of the colonial state. The subjective elements of colonialism involve the creation of ‘colonized subjects’, including a process of internalisation by which colonised subjects come to not only accept the limited forms of ‘misrecognition’ granted through the state but can even come to identify with it.29 Through this dual structure, colonial power now works through the inclusion of Indigenous peoples, actively shaping their perspectives in line with state discourses, rather than merely excluding them, as in years past. Therefore, any attempt to seek ‘the reconciliation of Indigenous nationhood with state sovereignty is still colonial insofar as it remains structurally committed to the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of our lands and self-determining authority’.30 Concerning the state in relation to Indigenous peoples on the international level, Corntassel argues that states and global organisations, for years, have been consistently framing Indigenous peoples’ self-determination claims in ways that ‘jeopardize the futures of indigenous communities’.31 He claims that states frst compartmentalise Indigenous self-determination by separating lands and resources from political and legal recognition of a limited autonomy. Second, he notes, states sometimes deny the existence of Indigenous peoples living within their borders. Thirdly, a political and legal entitlement framing by states deemphasises other responsibilities. Finally, he claims that states, through the rights discourse, limit the frameworks through which Indigenous peoples can seek self-determination. Like Alfred and Coulthard, Corntassel has concluded that states are deliberate and never changing in their behaviour. With this move, Corntassel limits and actually demeans Indigenous agency, overlooking the reality that Indigenous organisations themselves chose the human rights framework and rights discourse as a target sphere of action precisely because, as was evident in earlier struggles like slavery, civil rights or women’s rights, these were tools available to them that had a proven track record of opening up new possibilities and shifting previous state positions and behaviour. Indigenous advocates also cleverly realised, by the 1970s, that the anti-discrimination and decolonisation frames could be used together against states. States did, in no way, nefariously impose a rights framework on Indigenous peoples. Rather, Indigenous organisations and savvy Indigenous political actors deliberately chose to frame their self-determination struggles within the human rights framework in order to bring states into a double bind where they could not credibly claim to adhere to human rights and claim that they uphold equality while simultaneously denying Indigenous peoples’ human rights and leaving them with a diminished and unequal right of self-determination. But, because he is caught in the pessimism trap of seeing the state only as unified, deliberate and unchanging, Corntassel overlooks and diminishes the clear story of Indigenous agency and the potential for positive change in advancing self-determination in a multitude of ways. Pessimism Trap 3: Engagement with the Settler State is Futile, if Not Counter-Productive Since the state always intends to maintain, if not expand, colonial control, and is seeking to co-opt as many Indigenous peoples as possible in order to maintain or expand its dispossession and control, it is therefore futile, at best, and actually dangerous to Indigenous existence to engage with the state. Furthermore, all patterns of engagement will lead to co-optation as the state is cunning and unrelenting in its desire to co-opt Indigenous leaders, academics and professionals in order to gain or maintain control of Indigenous peoples. Alfred argues, in both his 2005 and 2009 books, that any Indigenous engagement with the state, including agreements and negotiations, is not only futile but fundamentally dangerous, as such pathways do not directly challenge the existing colonial structure and ‘to argue on behalf of indigenous nationhood within the dominant Western paradigm is self-defeating’.32 Alfred states that a ‘notion of nationhood or self-government rooted in state institutions and framed within the context of state sovereignty can never satisfy the imperatives of Native American political traditions’33 because the possibility for a true expression of Indigenous self-determination is ‘precluded by the state’s insistence on dominion and its exclusionary notion of sovereignty’.34 Worst of all, according to Alfred, when Indigenous communities frame their struggles in terms of asserting Aboriginal rights and title, but do so within a state framework, rather than resisting the state itself, it ‘represents the culmination of white society’s efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples’.35 Because it is impossible to advance Indigenous self-determination through any sort of engagement with the state, Coulthard also advocates for an Indigenous resurgence paradigm that follows both his mentor Taiaiake Alfred but also Anishinaabe feminist theorist Leanne Simpson.36 As Coulthard writes, ‘both Alfred and Simpson start from a position that calls on Indigenous peoples and communities to “turn away” from the assimilative reformism of the liberal recognition approach and to instead build our national liberation efforts on the revitalization of “traditional” political values and practices’.37 Drawing upon the prescriptive approach of these theorists, Coulthard proposes, in his concluding chapter, five theses from his analysis that are intended to build and solidify Indigenous resurgence into the future: 1. On the necessity of direct action, meaning that physical forms of Indigenous resistance, like protest and blockades, are very important not only as a reaction to the state but also as a means of protecting the lands that are central to Indigenous peoples’ existence; 2. Capitalism, No More!, meaning the rejection of capitalist forms of economic development in Indigenous communities in favour of land-based Indigenous political-economic alternative approaches; 3. Dispossession and Indigenous Sovereignty in the City, meaning the need for Indigenous resurgence movements ‘to address the interrelated systems of dispossession that shape Indigenous peoples’ experiences in both urban and land-based settings’38; 4. Gender Justice and Decolonisation, meaning that decolonisation must also include a shift away from patriarchy and an embrace of gender relations that are non-violent and refective of the centrality of women in traditional forms of Indigenous governance and society; and 5. Beyond the Nation-State. While Coulthard denies that he advocates complete rejection of engagement with the state’s political and legal system, he does assert that ‘our efforts to engage these discursive and institutional spaces to secure recognition of our rights have not only failed, but have instead served to subtly reproduce the forms of racist, sexist, economic, and political confgurations of power that we initially sought…to challenge’.39 He therefore advocates expressly for ‘critical self-refection, skepticism, and caution’ in a ‘resurgent politics of recognition that seeks to practice decolonial, gender-emancipatory, and economically nonexploitative alternative structures of law and sovereign authority grounded on a critical refashioning of the best of Indigenous legal and political traditions’.40 Corntassel also demonstrates the third pessimism trap, that all engagement with the state is ultimately futile. For the most part, however, Corntassel’s observation is that the UN system operates like a reverse Keck and Sikkink ‘boomerang model’ and ‘channels the energies of transnational Indigenous networks into the institutional fiefdoms of member countries’, by which an ‘illusion of inclusion’ is created.41 He argues that, in order to be included or their views listened to, Indigenous delegates at the UN must mimic the strategies, language, norms and modes of behaviour of member states and international institutions. Corntassel fnds that ‘what results is a cadre of professionalized Indigenous delegates who demonstrate more allegiance to the UN system than to their own communities’.42 In his final analysis, he charges that the co-optation of international Indigenous political actors is highly ‘effective in challenging the unity of the global Indigenous rights movement and hindering genuine dialogue regarding Indigenous self-determination and justice’.43 Finding that states deliberately co-opt and provide ‘illusions of inclusion’ to Indigenous political actors in UN settings, Corntassel comes to the same conclusion as Alfred concerning the futility of engagement, arguing that because transnational Indigenous networks are ‘channeled’ and ‘blunted’ by colonial state actors, ‘it is a critical time for Indigenous peoples to rethink their approaches to bringing Indigenous rights concerns to global forums’.44 Imagining a Post-Colonial Future: Pessimistic ‘Resurgence’ Versus the Optimism and Tenacity of Indigenous Movements on the Ground All of these writers advocate Indigenous resurgence, through a combination of rejecting the current reconciliation politics of settler colonial states, coupled with a return to land-based Indigenous expressions of governance as the only viable, ‘authentic’ and legitimate path to a better future for Indigenous peoples, which they refer to as decolonisation. While inherently critical in their orientation, these three approaches do make some positive and productive contributions to Indigenous movements. They help shed light on the various and subtle ways that Indigenous leaders and communities can become co-opted into a colonial system. They help us to hold leadership accountable. They also help us keep a strong focus on our traditional, cultural and spiritual values as well as our traditional forms of governance which then also helps us imagine future possibilities. As I have pointed out here, however, all three theorists are also caught in the same three pessimism traps: authenticity versus co-option; a vision of the state as unified, deliberate and never changing in its desire to colonise and control; and a view of engagement with the state as futile, if not dangerous, to Indigenous sovereignty and existence. When combined, these three pessimism traps aim to inhibit Indigenous peoples’ engagement with the state in any process that could potentially re-imagine and re-formulate their current relationship into one that could be transformative and post-colonial, as envisioned by the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The pessimism traps together work to foreclose any possibility that there could be credible openings of opportunity to negotiate a fairer and just relationship of co-existence with even the most progressive state government. This pessimistic approach is not innocuous. By overemphasising structure and granting the state an enormous degree of agency as a unitary actor, this pessimistic approach does a remarkable disservice to Indigenous resistance movements by proscribing, from academia, an extremely narrow view of what Indigenous self-determination can and should mean in practice. By overlooking and/or discounting Indigenous agency and not even considering the possibility that Indigenous peoples could themselves be calculating, strategic political actors in their own right, and vis-à-vis states, the pessimistic lens of the resurgence school unnecessarily, unproductively and unjustly limits the field of possibility for Indigenous peoples’ decision-making, thus actually countering and inhibiting expressions of Indigenous self-determination. By condemning—writ large—all Indigenous peoples and organisations that wish to seek peaceful co-existence with the state, negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with the state, and/or who have advocated on the international level for a set of standards that can provide a positive guiding framework for Indigenous-state relations, the pessimistic lens of resurgence forecloses much potential for new and improved relations, in any form, and is very likely to lead to deeper conflicts between states and Indigenous peoples, and potentially, even violent action, which Fanon indicated was the necessary outcome. The pessimism traps of the resurgence school are therefore, likely self-defeating for all but the most remote and isolated Indigenous communities. Further, this approach is quite out of step with the actions and vision of many Indigenous resistance movements on the ground who have been working for decades to advance Indigenous self-determination, both domestically and globally, in ways that transform the colonial state into something more just and may eventually present creative alternatives to the Westphalian state form in ways that could respect and accommodate Indigenous nations. Rather, it aims to shame and blame those who wish to explore creative and innovative post-colonial resolutions to the colonial condition. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration or UN Declaration) was adopted by the General Assembly in 2007 after 25 years of development. The Declaration is ground-breaking, given the key leadership roles Indigenous peoples played in negotiating and achieving this agreement.45 Additionally, for the first time in UN history, the rights holders, Indigenous peoples, worked with states to develop an instrument that would serve to promote, protect and affirm Indigenous rights, both globally and in individual domestic contexts.46 Many Indigenous organisations and movements, from dozens of countries around the world, were involved in drafting and negotiating the UN Declaration and are now advocating for its full implementation, both internationally and in domestic and regional contexts. In Canada, some of the key organisational players—the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), the Assembly of First Nations, and the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, or their predecessor organisations—were involved in the drafting and lengthy negotiations of the UN Declaration during the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. In the United States, organisations like the American Indian Law Alliance and the Native American Rights Fund have been involved as well as the Navajo Nation and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, who represent themselves as Indigenous peoples’ governing institutions. From Scandinavia, the Saami Council and the Sami Parliaments all play a key role in advancing Indigenous rights. In Latin America, organisations like the Confederación de Nationalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Consejo Indio de Sud America (CISA) advocate for implementation of the UN Declaration. The three, major transnational Indigenous organisations— the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the International Indian Treaty Council and the Inuit Circumpolar Council—were all key members of the drafting and negotiating team for the UN Declaration, and the latter two, which are still in existence, continue their strong advocacy for its full implementation. Implementation of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples requires fundamental and significant change, on both the international and domestic levels. Because implementation of Indigenous rights essentially calls for a complete and fundamental restructuring of Indigenous-state relationships, it expects states to enact and implement a signifcant body of legal, constitutional, legislative and policy changes that can accommodate such things as Indigenous land rights, free, prior and informed consent, redress and a variety of self-government, autonomy and other such arrangements. States are not going to implement this multifaceted and complex set of changes on their own, however. They will require significant political and moral pressure to hold them accountable to the rhetorical commitments they have made to support this level of change. They will also require ongoing conversation and negotiation with Indigenous peoples along the way, lest the process becomes problematically one-sided. Such processes ultimately require sustained political will, commitment and engagement over the long term, to reach the end result of radical systemic change and Indigenous state relationships grounded in mutual respect, co-existence and reciprocity. This type of fundamental change requires creative thinking, careful diplomacy, tenacity, and above all, optimistic vision, on the part of Indigenous peoples. The pessimistic approaches of the resurgence school are ultimately of little use in these efforts, other than as a cautionary tale against state power, of which the organisational players are already keenly aware. Further, by dismissing and discouraging all efforts at engagement with states, and especially with the blanket accusations that all who engage in such efforts are ‘co-opted’ and not ‘authentically’ Indigenous, the resurgence school actually creates unnecessary negative feelings and divisions amongst Indigenous movements who should be pooling limited resources and working together towards better futures

#### 4---IR is reflexive and effective---its track record of prediction proves. AND, sweeping criticisms of a fragmented field of research don’t answer the specificity of our studies.

Dan Reiter 15. Professor of Political Science at Emory University. “Scholars Help Policymakers Know Their Tools.” War on the Rocks. 8-27-2015. <https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/scholars-help-policymakers-know-their-tools/>

This critique is both narrowly true and narrow in perspective. Context is of course important, but foreign policy choices are not sui generis, there are patterns across space and time that inform decision-making. Policymakers recognize this and routinely draw lessons from history when making foreign policy decisions. As noted below, policymakers in other areas such as development and public health routinely rely on broader, more general studies to craft policy. And, broader scholarship can improve foreign policy performance, as evidenced by the ability of IR academics to build on their own work to predict outcomes, including for example forecasting the lengths of the conventional and insurgency phases of the U.S.–Iraq conflict in the 2000s.

But, even if one were to accept the limits of general work, there is a growing body of academic work that evaluates foreign policy tools as applied to a specific country or region. These studies ask questions such as whether:

Development projects reduced insurgent violence in Afghanistan; Drone strikes reduced insurgent violence in Pakistan; Development programs increased civic participation and social capital in Sudan; Building cell phone towers in Iraq reduced insurgent violence; Attempts to reintegrate combatants into society in Burundi succeeded; Security sector reform in Liberia increased the legitimacy of the government there; Road projects in India reduced insurgent violence; We can understand peacekeeping’s failure in Congo; Israel’s targeted assassinations reduced violent attacks from militants.

This is not by any means a dismissal of professional intelligence work. Academics are not intelligence analysts: They do not have access to contemporary intelligence data, nor are they generally trained to do things like examine the latest satellite photos of North Korean nuclear activities and make judgments about North Korea’s current plutonium production. And certainly, academic IR work can never replace professional intelligence work. But the best policy decisions marry timely, specific intelligence with academic work that has a more general perspective.

A third critique is that much of this academic work on foreign policy tools is unusable by policymakers because it is too quantitative and technically complex. Here, echoing a point made by Erik Voeten, there is a danger in not appreciating the importance of rigorous research design, including sophisticated quantitative techniques, for crafting effective policy. Sophisticated research design is not the enemy of effective policy, it is critically necessary for it. Certainly, the current academic focus on building research designs that permit causal inference speaks exactly to what policymakers care about the most: if implementing a certain policy will cause the desired outcome.

Or, put differently, bad research designs make for bad public policy. A classic example is school busing. In the 1960s and early 1970s, some cities adopted voluntary integration programs for public schools, in which families could volunteer to bus their children to schools in neighborhoods with different racial majorities. Policymakers used the favorable results for the voluntary programs to make the improper inference that mandatory busing policies would also work. The result was bad public policy and violence in the streets.

Sophisticated technical methods can improve our ability to make causal inferences, and can help solve other empirical problems. Consider that the heart of successful counterinsurgency is, according to U.S. military doctrine, winning the support of the population. Assessing whether certain policies do win public support requires collecting opinion data. A conventional method for measuring popular opinion is the survey, but of course, individuals in insurgency-stricken areas may be unwilling to reveal their true opinions to a survey-taker out of fear for their personal safety. Methodologists have crafted sophisticated techniques for addressing this issue, improving our ability to measure public support for the government in these areas. These techniques have been used to assess better the determinants of public support in insurgency-affected countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India.

Going forward, we will continue to need advanced methodologies to address pressing policy questions. Consider the U.S. military’s commitment to gender integration. The implementation of this commitment will be best informed if it rests on rigorous social science that address outstanding questions. Is there a Sacagawea effect, in which mixed gender units engaged in counterinsurgency are more effective than male-only units? How might mixed gender affect small unit cohesion in combat? How might mixed gender units reduce the incidence of sexual assault, both within the military and of assault committed by troops against civilians?

Certainly, other areas of public policy understand the importance of rigorous research design. Economic and development policy communities read the work of and employ economics Ph.D.s. Policymakers incorporate the findings of sophisticated studies on policy areas such as microfinance, gender empowerment, and foreign aid, knowing the best policy decisions must incorporate these studies’ findings.

Or consider public health policy. Lives are literally on the line as decision-makers must make decisions about issues such as vaccinations, nutritional recommendations, and air quality. Policymakers know they must use sophisticated technical studies executed by epidemiologists and other public health academics to craft the best policies.

Critics will argue that some U.S. policymakers remain alienated from contemporary academic IR work, with the suggestion that if IR academics let go of an obsession with technique, they will then be better able to connect with policymakers and help them craft better policy. I agree that IR academics need to find ways to communicate their results in clear, non-technical language. But the technical components of the work need to be there. Stripping them out directly undermines the ability of the research to give the right kinds of policy recommendations.

Let me conclude by noting that I am sympathetic to the concern that IR academics should think about the big picture as well as smaller questions, the forest of grand strategy as well as the trees of foreign policy tools. IR academics have the potential to make real contributions to big picture debates, to think hard about the essence of grand strategy by assembling a framework that effectively integrates foreign policy means and ends. The nature of the IR subfield and its integration of political economy and security, and its ability to think about structure as well as units, make it especially well positioned to consider these broad questions. The ability of IR academics to contribute to contemporary foreign policy debates is one of many reasons why political science should retain the subfield of IR and resist the temptation to replace the traditional empirical subfields of IR, comparative, and American with new subfields of conflict, political economy, behavior, and institutions.

Like good carpenters, foreign policymakers need to know their tools. Rigorous IR research is the only way to evaluate them effectively.

#### \*\*\*\*6----IR scholarship regarding the liberal order is not irredeemably racist

Gideon Rose 16, editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2016, “Review of, ‘White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations,’” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/2016-02-16/white-world-order-black-power-politics-birth-american

In this interesting and important yet flawed book, Vitalis seeks to bridge the “vast gulf divid[ing] international relations from Africana studies,” bringing the “racism [of the discipline of international relations] to light.” Conventional narratives of the field’s history, he argues, trace it to the rise of realism and national security concerns in the years around World War II, adding a few historical thinkers, such as Thucydides, to claim a timeless intellectual pedigree. But this ignores both the extensive mainstream scholarship of the first decades of the twentieth century that dealt with colonialism and racial issues and the pioneering work of African American writers in what he calls “the Howard School.” Consigning both to the memory hole, he says, paints a distorted picture of the discipline’s origins and nature, obscuring the role that international relations scholarship has played in the construction and perpetuation of white Western dominance.

These are major claims, and some of them hold up better than others. Vitalis is correct to shine a spotlight on the forgotten academic work of the first third of the twentieth century and offers a timely reminder of just how prevalent racialized thinking was and how central a role imperialism—as opposed to straightforward great-power relations—played in global affairs. Back then, for example, “policy relevance” in political science often meant figuring out how to train good colonial administrators. Vitalis also provides a service by telling the story of scholars such as Alain Locke, Ralph Bunche, and Rayford Logan, enriching readers’ understanding of midcentury intellectual debates over U.S. foreign policy and tracing how racism operated inside various professional institutions.

Vitalis is less convincing, however, in casting his analysis as an indictment of the postwar discipline of international relations, let alone its contemporary incarnation. To get there, one has to share his politics. Vitalis sees a project of U.S. imperial domination playing out over the course of the past century, with the “subjection” continuing today, “through new-old policies of intervention, tutelage, and targeted killings in new-old zones of anarchy and civilization deficit.” Given such a reading of U.S. foreign policy, it is not surprising that he believes “the history of ideas, institutions, and practices [in the field] has a constitutive role in their present forms and functions”—or that he sees today’s mainstream international relations scholars as handmaidens of an evil national security state and as the direct descendants of their racist predecessors of a century ago.

Scorning the notion that the postwar liberal international order represents anything particularly new or admirable, Vitalis scores a few points in noting how long it took for some earlier social and racial hierarchies, both international and domestic, to erode. But he refuses to accept the fact that they have indeed eroded. One is left wanting more analysis of how and why the attitudes and patterns of domination Vitalis describes gave way over time, and how the midcentury theorists and practitioners of the liberal international order understood and handled the paradoxes of its halting and inconsistent implementation.

#### 3---Psychoanalysis – the ENTIRE theory is non-falsifiable and should be rejected

Gordon 1, psychotherapist living and working in London, 2K1 ¶ (Paul, Psychoanalysis and Racism: The politics of defeat Race & Class v. 42, n. 4)

The problem with the application of psychoanalysis to social institutions is that there can be no testing of the claims made. If someone says, for instance, that nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, how can this be proved? The pioneers of psychoanalysis, from Freud onwards, all derived their ideas in the context of their work with individual patients and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient. Outside of the consulting room, there can be no such verification process, and the further one moves from the individual patient, the less purchase psycho- analytic ideas can have. Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking. But if every- thing is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true. An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some reflections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis. In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular film Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.

#### 4---Futurity is an effective frame for indigenous struggles. Their critique ignores the history of resistance.

Bryan Kamaoli KUWADA 15. PhD Candidate in English, University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa. “We live in the future. Come join us.” Ke Kuapu Hehiale (a group of indigenous Pacific and allied scholar/poet/activists). April 3. <https://hehiale.wordpress.com/2015/04/03/we-live-in-the-future-come-join-us/>.

It could not have been clearer from the words and the actions of the people up on the mauna and those standing in solidarity with them that they are concerned with nothing more than the very future of our world, our islands, and our people. Yet in boardrooms and newspapers, social media and overheard conversations, they have already been accused of “living in the past” or even of “wanting to keep Hawaiʻi in the Stone Age.” In fact, in an article on an earlier blockade to stop the Thirty Meter Telescope this past October, a science writer for the New York Times connected the action on the mauna with the repatriation of Native American burials from museums, and lumped them all together as an anti-science “turn back toward the dark ages.” Now, as much as I am devastated and inspired by what is going on up on the mountain one hundred and eighty-five miles away, this is not a post about Mauna a Wākea, because I am a malihini to that place and that issue, and can only say that I stand in support of our steadfast koa in those rocky heights.

What this post is about is how any time Hawaiians—or any other native people, for that matter—come out in force to push for more respect for our culture and language or to protect our places from this kind of destruction, we are dismissed as relics of the past, unable to hack it in the modern world with our antiquated traditions and practices. Though the very things that people say they love most about Hawaiʻi are actually what Hawaiians and their allies have been trying to protect for decades, we are still considered nothing more than speedbumps slowing everyone down on the road to progress. We are even smugly condemned as hypocrites for daring to use smartphones and social media and cars or any kind of technology in our activism, because somehow asserting ourselves as modern, innovative, future-looking native peoples does not jibe with the image of living fossils that the rest of society seems to have of us.

Yet remembering the past does not mean that we are wallowing in it. Paying attention to our history does not mean we are ostriching our heads in the sand, refusing to believe that the modern world is all around us. We native peoples carry our histories, memories, and stories in our skin, in our bones, in our health, in our children, in the movement of our hands, in our interactions with modernity, in the way we hold ourselves on the land and sea. Sometimes people see themselves implicated in the injustices and abuses we wear so clearly on our selves, and it makes them uncomfortable. They see a queen deposed and held prisoner in her own palace. They see children taken away from their tribes to abusive boarding schools, shorn of their hair, and made to refuse their native language. They see people and animals used as guinea pigs for nuclear experiments, the only outcry coming from those concerned about the animals. It makes them want to look away and ignore us. It makes them tell us to stop showing it to them. They are the ones who want us to only be living in the past, so that their pain can end.

But we don’t carry only pain, we carry connection. Whenever we resist or insist in the face of the depredations of developers, corporate predators, government officials, university administrators, or even the general public, we are trying to protect our relationships to our ancestors, our language, our culture, and our ʻāina. But at the same time, we are trying to reawaken and protect their connections as well.

That short-sighted model of “progress”—that we seem to be standing in the way of—hinges upon all of us, all of Hawaiʻi’s people, all of the Pacific’s people, all of the world’s people losing connection to land, to sea, to other human beings. The less you feel these connections, the easier it is for you to be convinced that unrestricted development is the highest and best use of land. That kind of progress means the University of Hawaiʻi and its international partners justify building on Mauna a Wākea by pointing to permits and documents that they have secured rather than any real sense of kuleana. That progress means farms exploit migrant labor and then label their products as organic and sustainable. That progress means Freeport McMoRan and Rio Tinto brag about the amazing knowledge it took to build the largest copper mine in the world in the mountains of West Papua but insist that they don’t know how to keep it from polluting the entire Aghawagon River ecosystem. That progress means our state tries to legislate homeless people out of existence because they are an eyesore for tourists but do nothing about the structural inequalities that force them to live on the sidewalks of Kakaʻako and in the bushes of Waiʻanae Boat Harbor. All of these things done in the name of rootless progress show (un)surprisingly little care for trying to truly progress and create a future that we all want for the coming generations.

And when you see the possibility of “progress” in this more connected way, you see that we are actually the ones looking to the future. We are trying to get people back to the right timescale, so that they can understand how they are connected to what is to come. One of the urgencies for the construction company trying to break ground for the telescope on the mauna is that they have a limited time in which to execute the contract. But we are operating on geological and genealogical time. Protecting the ʻāina, carrying on our traditions, speaking our language, and acting as kahu for our sacred places are not things measured in days, or weeks, or even years. This work spans generations and eras and epochs.

Our genealogies are a backbone stretching to the very inception of these islands, and when we understand our genealogy, we know our origins, where we have been. We always have our ancestors at our back. That certainty gives us a wider possibility of movement, a more supple way to navigate through the world. Standing on our mountain of connections, our foundation of history and stories and love, we can see both where the path behind us has come from and where the path ahead leads. This connection assures us that when we move forward, we can never be lost because we always know how to get back home. The future is a realm we have inhabited for thousands of years. You cannot do otherwise when you rely on the land and sea to survive. All of our gathering practices and agricultural techniques, the patterned mat of loʻi kalo, the breath passing in and out of the loko iʻa, the Kū and Hina of picking plants are predicated on looking ahead. This ensures that the land is productive into the future, that the sea will still be abundant into the future, and that our people will still thrive into the future.

This is the future we are leading the way to, the future we are going to live in, the future our ancestors fought for, the future we still fight for.

Come join us.

#### 5---Our reps are good.

--CHN = Council of the Haida Nation, government of the peoples of the Haida Gwaii, an archipelago claimed by Canada

Weiss 15 (Joseph J.Z. Weiss, Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago, “Unsettling Futures: Haida Future-Making, Politics and Mobility in the Settler Colonial Present,” Ph.D. thesis, December 2015, p.216-232, https://knowledge.uchicago.edu/bitstream/handle/11417/1121/Weiss\_uchicago\_0330D\_13139.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)KMM

Conclusion: “What’s next? Just guess.” Signs of the Future One of the more recent additions to the socio-landscape of Old Massett, which I noticed on a return visit in 2014, was a series of blue signs that had appeared in many of the lawns on reserve and a good few uptown. The sign was a good two feet high and emblazoned with capitalized text: UNITED AGAINST ENBRIDGE. Below the text was a picture of a salmon. The salmon and the first word, “UNITED,” were in stark, attention-grabbing white, while the other text was in black. The signs, I later discovered, were distributed for five dollars each by the “Friends of Wild Salmon,” a coalition of northern British Columbia residents – including both First Nations and non-First Nations members – working together to oppose the Enbridge Gateway Pipeline Project.1 Perhaps appropriately, then, I noticed the sign on the lawns of both Haida and non-Haida, in Old Massett, (New) Masset, and out by Towtown. The signs may have been new, but their message is one that should have become familiar to us at this point: The people of Haida Gwaii oppose “Enbridge;” that is, The Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipelines Project. The project, first proposed in the mid-2000s, seeks to construct two pipelines to transport crude oil and condensate from northern Alberta to Kitimat on the coast of British Columbia.2 The oil would then be transported via “super-tanker” from the coast, through the Hecate Straight that passes between the west coast and the islands of Haida Gwaii before being exported to other nations (particularly China). Enbridge has received heavy support for the project from Canada’s current Conservative government, headed by Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and in 2013 the Enbridge Joint-Review Panel – despite the words of hippies and Haida alike, alongside fierce opposition from all over the northwest coast - approved the pipelines, albeit with 209 required conditions.3 As a partnership between Canadian federal and corporate interests, the Enbridge Pipelines Project promises a future horizon of economic prosperity, one that unequivocally justifies any environmental risk in the present. On Haida Gwaii, Enbridge presages a rather different future, one in which the unpredictable waters of the Hecade Straight all but guarantee a tanker spill. Such a spill would devastate the waters and lands of the islands and the neighbouring coastline of British Columbia, destroying the fish and poisoning the plants that currently draw on ocean waters and the animals that feed thereon. Neither eagles nor ravens could survive, living as they do on a diet that consists primarily of marine life, a fact which all but guarantees the disappearance of Eagles and Ravens, the Haida people whose lifeways as such are so fundamentally tied to the islands of Haida Gwaii. Haida Gwaii could no longer be home. A song recorded in protest again Enbridge by Aboriginal artist Kinnie Starr and animated as a music video by Haidawood, a team of Haida and non-Haida stop-motion artists and animators, makes this threat explicit, asking in its opening lines “Who will save these waters, save them for our great granddaughters, save them for our great grand-daughter’s sons, […] save them before all is dead and gone?”4 This nightmare future, this future that is no future, is one that looms large over the whole of this dissertation. It is familiar because it is a reiteration of the horror of ecological cataclysm that the CHN formed itself in opposition against, that the “hippies” risk metonymically bringing about by taking from the lands and waters without respect. But it is also familiar because in a broader sense it is the future that settler colonialism attempted to give to Native peoples; indeed, to render as their already given destiny. This is the future of indigenous erasure, of ultimate disappearance, of a closed temporality which can only end in “all dead and gone.” As I have also hopefully shown in each of my chapters, however, the future of “no future” is never taken as inevitable or already determined by Haida people. The work of future-making instead always acts to ward off the nightmare future of Haida erasure, always puts in its place instead multiple possible futures in which Haida people continue. Take the blue signs on the lawns of the Masset(t)s, Old and New, implicitly answering Kinnie Starr’s question with the bold declaration that the islands (will) stand “UNITED” against Enbridge. But the social significances of these futures are never encompassed solely by the ways in which they respond to the threat of nightmare futures. As we saw in Chapter 3, for instance, the production of a future of Haida and non-Haida unity is considerably more complicated than the declaration of shared solidarity, speaking back to a particular history of Haida and settler relations and fantasy schemas, looking forward towards finding productive ways in which non-Haida can be integrated into Haida systems of sociality and responsibility. To speak of a future united against Enbridge is thus necessarily to speak of many other things, just as it is the case when speaking of a future of Haida return, a future of care-full leadership, or a future of traditional authority. Larger social worlds unfold out of the constitution of particular futures. This is why, more than anything, I want to make clear in the final, concluding chapter of this dissertation that the political (if not the existential) significance of Haida future-making does not lie simply in the specific ways in which individual futures respond to particular dilemmas of the settler colonial present. Rather, what is most crucial about future-making as a way of thinking out from within the temporal brackets of settler colonialism’s deferred erasure is simply the fact of future-making itself. What matters the most is the capacity to say, as Haida rapper Ja$e ElNino does in a guest appearance in Starr’s song, “Now expect the best from the northwest/ What’s next? Just guess.” ElNino asserts the openness of the future, challenging his listeners to even attempt to predict the field of possibilities still to come. This does not mean, though, that this openness is unmoored. Quite the opposite, ElNino asks us to “expect the best of the northwest,” in response to the threat of Enbridge and, I think, more generally. In this spirit, in what follows I highlight the significance of location to indigenous futurity, exploring how Old Massett, its neighbouring communities along Masset Inlet, and the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii act as locations around which the very openness of Haida futures can be articulated. My discussion will be largely synthetic, reading together my previous chapters to attempt to arrive at a few conclusions for this dissertation at a whole. I begin with a discussion of Haida Gwaii, once again, as “home,” asking what it means to consider the islands as a Haida homeland (and one that requires “care” as such) in the light of the futures I have sketched out. I then draw on this to pose a few suggestions for the political anthropology of indigenous peoples and its abiding contemporary concern with sovereign rights and territoriality. Finally, I conclude by drawing out the multiple meanings of my titular phrase, “unsettling futures,” in the context of Haida futuremaking. Homeland Haida Gwaii is in at least some sense at the center of each of the futures I have discussed in this dissertation. It is the home to which Haida are expected (and expect) to return, the “cornucopia” of off-the-grid fantasy, the ongoing historical space of complex social and material relations that these fantasies elide, the perpetually at risk ecological landscape which demands (and authorizes) the CHN’s care and respect. And, as we have seen, these various futures for the islands are not isolated from one another. Quite the opposite, futures proliferate in response to each other. The potential for non-Haida homing necessitates strategic forms of future-oriented social integration to bring these new arrivals into respectful relations with the Haida world, the nightmare non-future of ecological collapse is warded off by the attempt to constitute care-full futures under Haida control. What all these Haida futures have in common – at least as they relate to the islands - is that they work to preserve Haida Gwaii, and the community of Old Massett in particular, as spaces in which Haida futures remain possible. This fact, as I have already begun to suggest in Chapter 2, might help us to resolve some of James Clifford’s dilemmas in relation to indigenous mobility. As I pointed towards then, the notion that “place” is significant to indigenous peoples – politically, socially, affectively, culturally – has become one of the essential components of how “indigeneity” is understood as a global phenomenon and a strategic identity from which rights claims can be advanced. Take Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their *distinctive spiritual relationship* with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities to future generations in this regard (Assembly 2007:10, emphasis mine). But what precisely does it mean to have a “distinctive, spiritual relationship” to a place, and who determines what might constitute that relationship? Here one of the perils of Povinelli’s “cunning of recognition,” as indigenous rights to territory become conflated with - and evaluated against - essentialized settler notions of Native ecological spirituality and/or emplacedness (cf: Raibmon 2005; Nadasdy 2003). If indigeneity thereby takes on the significance of being “rooted” in a particular place, of having certain identifiably “distinctive” cultural relationships to that place that others might lack, then the fact of indigenous mobility would indeed pose a profound dilemma for the category of indigeneity on the one hand and the capacity to make claims to territorial rights *qua* one’s indigeneity on the other. But there is a remarkable temporal shallowness to all this. To give a representative example, the Australian state criteria for what constitutes “cultural rights to territory” that Povinelli interrogates function solely in the past and the present, mandating that Aboriginal people show continuity of occupation and of the cultural practices associated with “Aboriginal occupation” in the mind of the court in order to be recognized as possessing a rightful claim to their home territories (Povinelli 2002). Erased in this is the possibility that a territory could be the site of departure and return, that it could have a future horizon that is flexible, subject to transformation alongside the transformations of the people(s) who call it home, without thereby necessarily losing its integrity as a rightful space of indigenous occupation. Such a possibility is not controversial for my Haida interlocutors. Rather, it has the status of an already-given certainty, community common sense - though there is without doubt much social work that goes into the production of that certainty. What makes indigenous mobility fraught, then, might have rather more to do with the constitution of settler polities than it does with the actual practices of indigenous peoples. Consider the various ways in which we have already seen colonial authorities attempt to control Haida movement, from the forced expulsions of 19th century Victoria to the removal of Haida children from the islands for residential schools less than a century later. Consider too the manufacture of the reserves themselves, the fixing of two Haida “Bands” with their own federally determined territories, beyond which Haida people could claim no rights over land, waters, or resources (cf: Harris 2002). This is a logic of containment, of isolation. In leaving their assigned spaces, Native peoples were assumed by colonial authorities to be leaving the space of their Nativeness behind, assimilating into settler society on its terms. Indeed, this was the motivating logic of the residential schools program, which took as its premise the idea that “Indians” could always “backslide” into “savage customs” as long as they remained in their homes and with their families. Aboriginal children thus had to be brought somewhere else to learn how to join “civilized,” that is, white Christian, society (Miller 1996). Reserves could thus be rendered as the last bastions of a “weird and waning race,” to quote Scott, their inhabitants temporally foreclosed and spatially fixed. The notion that indigenous people could move without ceasing to be (or ceasing to fight for their rights to self-determination and Title to their lands) unsettles this narrative, just as does the intertwined possibility of indigenous futurity. The relationship to Haida Gwaii that we’ve seen sketched out by the Haida futures explored in this dissertation does not preclude the possibility of “distinctive spiritual relationships” between Haida and their home territories. Quite the opposite, the ineffable quality of homing alone suggests that many of my interlocutors feel a connection to their home that goes beyond the kinds of practices that are only possible on the islands, their beauty or their history. Indeed, when considered as home, when considered as a site that requires care, there is little doubt that Haida Gwaii can encompass a wide range of phenomenological, affective, social, and cultural ways of relating to its lands and waters by Haida people (and their neighbours, at times for good, at times for ill). But it is not these relations as such that encompass the totality of Haida Gwaii’s significance. Rather, what is of greatest concern to my interlocutors is the continuing future possibility that relations like that *could be* formed, that people *could continue* to be called home to Haida Gwaii once they’ve fully explored the world off-island, that the qualities that precisely *make* Haida Gwaii home *could* be preserved. This is what it means, I think, to “take care” of Haida Gwaii, to allow it to continue as a homeland for uncounted future generations. Though they certainly emphasize the need for Haida Gwaii to be maintained as a location for Haida futurity, this does not mean that the futures we have seen expend all the possible ways in which such future forms of Haida social, material, ecological, and relational life could be formed. Recall Ja$e ElNino’s challenge of a future so open that its possible contents can only be guessed at. What Haida future-making demonstrates is that there are a set of potentialities which are worth protecting so that Haida people can continue to access them, to come home to them, even as continuing forms of mobility and political processes can also shape and reshape Haida social and cultural life on and off the islands. Homeland is not a regimented place where Haida people *must* always live in order to be authentically Haida. Rather, it is a location where they should always be able to, in their own (necessarily multiple, often contested, sometimes even contradictory) terms. Sovereignty At the same time, there is an inescapably political dimension to the attempt to render Haida Gwaii as the homeland of a still open Haida future. The assertion of the (located) openness of the future does not necessarily make it so. As I noted in the first part of this dissertation, the flow of Haida departures and returns unfold in the broader context of the settler, capitalist state; indeed, they are made necessary in part by the current absence of economic opportunity on island, just as the arrival of potentially threatening strangers is a result of their privileged position in the very capitalist economy they seek to escape. Constituting futures in which Haida people have the freedom to engage with that economy (and settler society more generally) as they see fit while retaining the capacity to come home (complicated as that process might be) also reiterates the inescapability of some form of engagement with that socio-economy. Likewise, the notion of Haida Gwaii as Haida homeland cannot be separated from current Haida struggles to assert their rights to the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii, the resources found therein, and their sovereign capacity to govern themselves and the islands in the ways they find appropriate. This is, recall, the very crux of the CHN’s own commitment to the assurance of futurity, as it is only by positioning itself as the rightful, sovereign government of the Haida Nation and its homeland of Haida Gwaii that it can adequately care for the islands and protect them from external threat. And the continuing advance of the Enbridge project despite fierce opposition from CHN, the Old Massett Village Council, their Haida constituents, and the non-Haida actors with whom they are “united against Enbridge” (and this alongside protest all over the northwest coast) gives the nightmare futures of environmental collapse – pushed through by corporate interests and Canadian politicians - a frightening immanence. The assertion of the openness of the future is made, in short, in (and against) a context in which closures remain endemic. And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the nightmare futures of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, threatens the sustainability of all life; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives regardless of their relative indigeneity, race, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The nightmare futures that Haida people constitute alternative futures to ward against are not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are erasures of settler society itself. There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely because Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making we find the implicit assertion that Haida people can make futures that address the dilemmas of Haida and settler life alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and settler liberal governance makes itself possible and legitimate through a perpetual deferral of the problems of the present, then part of the power of Haida future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives. It is no coincidence that we find this in the midst of a struggle over sovereignty. And this not just in the sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s ongoing assertion of its sovereign right to govern the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii on behalf of all Haida people, as we saw in Chapter 5. Rather, as Joanne Barker has argued, over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century sovereignty has emerged as a: particularly valued term within indigenous scholarship and social movements and through the media of cultural production. It [is] a term around which analyses of indigenous histories and cultures were organized and whereby indigenous activists articulate their agendas for social change (Barker 2005:18). Through the assertion of sovereignty, indigenous political leaders, activists and scholars refute “the dominant notion that indigenous people [are] merely one among many ‘minority groups’ under the administration of state social service and welfare programs.” Instead, “sovereignty defines indigenous people with concrete rights to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy under international law” (18). The trouble is, of course, that indigenous claims to sovereignty are always made within the context of colonial nation-states, ones whose own legitimacy is put at considerably risk both by the prospect of self-determining indigenous Nations (re)-emerging within their boundaries and the troubling of their own historical narratives of sovereign rights (cf: Comaroff and Comaroff 2003b). (One of these narratives, which reinterpreted indigenous lands as *terra nullius* and thus open to occupation, we’ve encountered already in Chapter 3). Thus, while sovereignty might indeed “define” indigenous peoples with concrete rights to territorial Title and self-determination, in theory equal under international law to the states who also lay claim to their territories, that definition does not in and of itself make possible the *practice* of this sovereignty. In this regard settler states such as Canada have shifted in their response to First Peoples’ sovereignty claims from outright rejection to a set of policies of selective recognition,5 but even the latter still positions Native nations as being subject to the authority and oversight (if not the structural forms) of the state. This means, as we have seen in Chapter 5, that indigenous governments such as the Council of the Haida Nation are in a precarious position, attempting to constitute their own sovereign authority without access to many of the conventional means of sovereignty in Western political thought – e.g., the monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1946), decisive authority to make and enact law (Schmitt 2005), or exclusive territorial control (Brown 2010; cf: Hobbes 1994). Alongside this precarity is the equally anxious question of whether or not sovereignty is even an appropriate analytical to center indigenous rights around precisely because it is historically a Western concept, one that had been drawn on to dispossess indigenous peoples over the course of settler colonial history (Barker 2005:18–19). (Indeed, the very next essay in Barker’s edited volume, by Mohawk scholar Taiake Alfred, categorically rejects sovereignty as an inappropriate tool for indigenous political assertions for these reasons and, also, because it draws attention away from developing and furthering “genuinely” Aboriginal political modes of thought (Alfred 2005; cf: Alfred 2009). The fact that sovereignty remains such a preeminent concept in the struggle for indigenous rights even though it is both epistemologically problematic and politically constrained has meant that there has been a recent push in both anthropology and indigenous studies to “widen” the definition of sovereignty, so that it might encompass multiple forms of indigenous social, political and legal practice outside of the conventional purview of “sovereign power” (e.g. Cattelino 2008; Richland 2011; Simpson 2000; Simpson 2014). Or, as Joanne Barker puts it: There is no fixed meaning for what *sovereignty* is – what it means by definition, what it implies in public debate, or how it has been conceptualized in international, nation, or indigenous law. Sovereignty – and its related histories, perspectives, and identities – is embedded within the specific social relations in which it is invoked and given meaning. How and when it emerges and functions are determined by the “located” political agendas and cultural perspectives of those who rearticulate it into public debate or political document to do a specific work of opposition, invitation, or accommodation. It is no more possible to stabilize what *sovereignty* means and how it matters to those who invoke it than it is to forget the historical and cultural embeddedness of indigenous peoples’ multiple and contradictory political perspectives and agendas for empowerment, decolonization, and social justice (Barker 2005:21, emphasis original). The opening up of sovereignty as flexible, multiple, and subject to all manner of diverse rearticulations carries particular weight (and, perhaps, ambiguity) since, as a historical concept in Western political theory, sovereignty was overwhelmingly concerned with closure. As Wendy Brown argues in her Walled States, Waning Sovereignty, the classic vision of sovereign power rests in the capacity to divide the inside from the outside, to make borders around a people – a “nation” – and separate that people from those outside it. Thus Schmitt’s “friend-enemy” distinction, for instance, or even John Locke’s consistent preoccupation with fences as a way of marking the existence of territory (Brown 2010; cf: Schmitt 1996; Locke 1988). The historical conditions of indigenous sovereignty claims in the context of settler colonialism make such absolute closures impossible for indigenous peoples. We might add, though, that their persistent presence also challenges the closure of the settler nation-state. Indeed, this is part of Brown’s point. The very fact that we see ever more spectacular performances of sovereign power on the part of contemporary nation-states – e.g., the titular “walls” that are being constructed along the borders of an increasing number of states - is a sign of the very insecurity of their political authority (Brown 2010).6 The conditions of settler colonial sovereignty, in other words, may be rather more “open,” and thus closer to those of indigenous “nation-within-nations,” then they may at first appear. If this means, in turn, that the future of settler political life is becoming as uncertain as the future for indigenous life has always been since the advent of settlement, then this means only what we have already begun to see: the dilemmas that Haida people confront in their future-making practices are also the dilemmas facing settler society. Take Chapter 4, in which the absence of any “one” definitive governing entity compels the constitution of an aspirational framework of accountability which could, were it realized, render navigable Haida relations to the many governments that claim their loyalties. As I hinted at there, such dilemmas are not restricted to the Haida sociopolitical world; rather, they may in fact be endemic to contemporary democratic societies and the multiple forms of governance (licit and otherwise) that emerge therein. In suggesting that there are Haida ways of refiguring a shared Haida-settler set of contemporary problematics, we might think of Haida future-making as simultaneously an instantiation of the multiple, flexible and always contingently located practices of sovereignty to which Barker points and a different way of thinking about indigenous political potentiality. In the former sense, Haida future-making is without doubt concerned with carving out spaces in which Haida existence can continue, expand, and change without losing the capacity to reproduce itself as, precisely, Haida existence. Thus the processes of homecoming we explored in Chapter 2, or Chapter 5’s explicitly political attempts to establish control over the islands for future generations. If the absence of indigenous sovereignty is the absence of the capacity of an indigenous people to (self)-determine their own futures, then the constitution of Haida futures can be seen exactly as sovereign work, whether in the overt sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s assertions or the somewhat more implicit mode of Alice Stevens’ proposed mass adoptions. Significant here, though, is the fact that these acts of future-making carry meanings beyond their status as “responses” to the social and political dilemmas of contemporary Haida life. Thus Alice Stevens’ adoptions bring “hippie” children into the framework of Haida kinship relations, in one sense neutralizing their potential threat, but also constituting a complex new network of social relations between Haida and non-Haida whose potential significances go well beyond the protection of Haida territory and resources; thus the Council of the Haida Nation emerges as a “state-like” governing entity through its authorizing promise to “take care” of the islands, but in so doing takes on a series of new roles in Haida political life whose full consequences remain to be seen. If it is a sovereign action to envision an opening of possible futures for Haida people, then this very openness might also exceed the boundaries of sovereignty as a problematic for indigenous people even as it responds to them. Which is also, perhaps, why Haida futures seem so consistently to sketch out social, ecological, and political fields that encompass non-Haida; more, that are futures for Canada as well as for the Haida people living within the nation-state’s borders. Or, at least, futures that have the capacity to be so. What would it mean to figure an indigenous sovereignty that speaks beyond itself, one that promises to invert the order of settler domination through reconfiguring the shared futures of indigenous and settler peoples? This would not be a sovereignty premised on territorial closure, or even absolute political autonomy. It would, however, decisively overturn any settler colonial anticipations of the inevitable erasure of Native peoples. Quite the opposite, it would position indigenous practices of anticipation, aspiration, certainty, and anxiety at the forefront of contemporary modes of political imagination. Unsettling Futures A question remains, however. Could such a refiguring of the temporal and political horizon of settler and indigenous relationships remain possible even if the futures that indigenous people work to constitute remain unrealized in the settler colonial present? Or, put another way, we must always be careful not to conflate a capacity *to* form new futures for settler nation-states with the actual materializations of these futures. The Haida futures that I have discussed, even as they promise possible ways of navigating – of restructuring, even – the settler-Haida present, remain firmly bound by the colonial constraints of this present. But perhaps the stakes here have never been about overthrowing the Canadian colonial order outright. Rather, what I hope this dissertation has shown is that Haida future-making has the capacity to unsettle the settler colonial present, to challenge its received categories and demonstrate how, slowly, gradually, Haida people are reconfiguring its terms through the work of producing the future. Certainly, the sheer fact of Haida futurity should put to the lie any further notion that Haida people exist only to replicate their past or live only in the deferral of their eventual disappearance. The future is alive and well in Old Massett, although this does not meant that it is not also a site of profound anxieties. In working to ward off those anxieties through the juxtaposition of nightmare futures against their more desirable alternatives, then, Haida people unsettle the epistemological foundations of the forms of settler colonialism and liberalism against which Byrd and Povinelli write. At the same time (if you’ll pardon the pun), I think we can see the social work that futuremaking does iteratively, as a gradual reshaping of the actual conditions of Canadian society. Here I borrow Judith Butler’s suggestion, following Foucault, that the regulatory norms of society function only through their consistent and unstable reiteration (and materialization) in everyday social life.7 From this perspective, the ways in which Haida people work within and even reiterate the constraints and demands of Canadian settler mainstream society can also slowly and strategically shift those very constraints and demands, materializing a HaidaCanadian future that might in fact be quite different from the present even as it does not ever fully “escape” from its dilemmas. Perhaps the most unsettling potential of all here lies simply in the ways in which Haida people incorporate the conditions of the settler colonial present as being paths towards Haida futures. Not vanished, or vanquished. Ongoing.

#### There is no single symbolic order or collective unconscious.

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1. W H A T DOFEMIN ISTS W AN T IN A D ISCO U R SE TH EO RY?

Let me begin by posing two questions: What might a theory of discourse contribute to feminism? And what, therefore, should feminists look for in a theory of discourse? I suggest that a conception of discourse can help us understand at least four things, all of which are interrelated. First, it can help us understand how people’s social identities are fashioned and altered over time. Second, it can help us understand how, under conditions of inequality, social groups in the sense of collective agents are formed and unformed. Third, a conception of discourse can illuminate how the cultural hegemony of dominant groups in society is secured and contested. Fourth and finally, it can shed light on the prospects for emancipatory social change and political practice. Let me elaborate.

First, consider the uses of a conception of discourse for understanding social identities. The basic idea here is that people s social identities are complexes of meanings, networks of interpretation. To have a social identity, to be a woman or a man, for example, just is to live and to act under a set of descriptions. These descriptions, of course, are not simply secreted by peoples’s bodies; nor are they simply exuded by people s psyches. Rather, they are drawn from the fund of interpretive possibilities available to agents in specific societies. It follows that, in order to understand the gender dimension of social identity, it does not suffice to study biology or psychology. Instead, one must study the historically specific social practices through which cultural descriptions of gender are produced and circulated.3

Moreover, social identities are exceedingly complex. They are knitted together from a plurality of different descriptions arising from a plurality of different signifying practices. Thus, no one is simply a woman; one is rather, for example, a white, Jewish, middle-class woman, a philosopher, a lesbian, a socialist, and a mother.4 Because everyone acts in a plurality of social contexts, moreover, the different descriptions comprising any individuals social identity fade in and out of focus. Thus, one is not always a woman in the same degree; in some contexts, ones womanhood figures centrally in the set of descriptions under which one acts; in others, it is peripheral or latent.5 Finally, it is not the case that peoples social identities are constructed once and for all and definitively fixed. Rather, they alter over time, shifting with shifts in agents’ practices and affiliations. Even the way in which one is a woman will shift— as it does, to take a dramatic example-, when one becomes a feminist. In short, social identities are discursively constructed in historically specific social contexts; they are complex and plural; and they shift over time. One use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing, then, is in understanding social identities in their full socio-cultural complexity, thus in demystifying static, single variable, essentialist views of gender identity.

A second use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing is in understanding the formation of social groups. How does it happen, under conditions of domination, that people come together, arrange themselves under the banner of collective identities, and constitute themselves as collective social agents? How do class formation and, by analogy, gender formation occur?

Clearly, group formation involves shifts in people s social identities and therefore also in their relation to social discourse. One thing that happens here is that pre-existing strands of identities acquire a new sort of salience and centrality. These strands, previously submerged among many others, are reinscribed as the nub of new self-definitions and affiliations.6 For example, in the current wave of feminist ferment, many of us who had previously been “ women” in some taken-for-granted way have now become “ women” in the very different sense of a discursively self-constituted political collectivity. In the process, we have remade entire regions of social discourse. We have invented new terms for describing social reality— for example, “ sexism,” “ sexual harassment,” “ marital, date, and acquaintance rape,” “ labor force sex-segregation,” “ the double shift,” and “ wife-battery.” We have also invented new language games such as consciousness raising and new, institutionalized public spheres such as the Society for Women in Philosophy.7 The point is that the formation of social groups proceeds by struggles over social discourse. Thus, a conception of discourse is useful here, both for understanding group formation and for coming to grips with the closely related issue of socio-cultural hegemony.

“ Hegemony” is the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci s term for the discursive face of power. It is the power to establish the “ common sense” or “ doxa” of a society, the fund of self-evident descriptions of social reality that normally go without saying.8 This includes the power to establish authoritative definitions of social situations and social needs, the power to define the universe of legitimate disagreement, and the power to shape the political agenda. Hegemony, then, expresses the advantaged position of dominant social groups with respect to discourse. It is a concept that allows us to recast the issues of social identity and social groups in the light of societal inequality. How do pervasive axes of dominance and subordination affect the production and circulation of social meanings? How does stratification along lines of gender, “ race,” and class affect the discursive construction of social identities and the formation of social groups? T h e notion of hegemony points to the intersection of power, inequality, and discourse. However, it does not entail that the ensemble of descriptions that circulate in society comprise a monolithic and seamless web, nor that dominant groups exercise an absolute, topdown control of meaning. On the contrary, “ hegemony” designates a process wherein cultural authority is negotiated and contested. It presupposes that societies contain a plurality of discourses and discursive sites, a plurality of positions and perspectives from which to speak. Of course, not all of these have equal authority. Yet conflict and contestation are part of the story. Thus, one use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing is to shed light on the processes by which the socio-cultural hegemony of dominant groups is achieved and contested. What are the processes by which definitions and interpretations inimical to w om en s interests acquire cultural authority? What are the prospects for mobilizing counter-hegemonic feminist definitions and interpretations to create broad oppositional groups and alliances?

The link between these questions and emancipatory political practice is, I believe, fairly obvious. A conception of discourse that lets us examine identities, groups, and hegemony in the ways I have been describing would be of considerable use to feminist practice. It would valorize the empowering dimensions of discursive struggles without leading to “culturalist” retreats from political engagement.9 In addition, the right kind of conception would counter the disabling assumption that women are just passive victims of male dominance. That assumption over-totalizes male dominance, treating men as the only social agents- and rendering inconceivable our own existence as feminist theorists and activists. In contrast, the sort of conception I have been proposing would help us understand how, even under conditions of subordination, women participate in the making of culture.

2. LACANIANISM AND THE LIMITS OF STRU CTU RA LISM

In light of the foregoing, what sort of conception of discourse will be useful for feminist theorizing? What sort of conception best illuminates social identities, group formation, hegemony, and emancipatory practice?

In the postwar period, two approaches to theorizing language became influential among political theorists. The first is the structuralist model, which studies language as a symbolic system or code. Derived from Saussure, this model is presupposed in the version of Lacanian theory I shall be concerned with here; in addition, it is abstractly negated but not entirely superseded in deconstruction and in related forms of French “ womens writing.” The second influential approach to theorizing language may be called the pragmatics model, which studies language at the level of discourses, as historically specific social practices of communication. Espoused by such thinkers as Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu, this model is operative in some but not all dimensions of the work of Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. In the present section of this chapter, I shall argue that the first, structuralist model is of only limited usefulness for feminist theorizing.

Let me begin by noting that there are good prima facie reasons for feminists to be suspicious of the structuralist model. This model constructs its object of study by abstracting from exactly what we need to focus on, namely, the social practice and social context of communication. Indeed, the abstraction from practice and context are among the founding gestures of Saussurean linguistics. Saussure began by splitting signification into langue, the symbolic system or code, and parole, speakers’ uses of language in communicative practice or speech. He then made the first of these, langue, the proper object of the new science of linguistics, and relegated the second, parole, to the status of a devalued remainder.10 At the same time, Saussure insisted that the study of langue be synchronic rather than diachronic; he thereby posited his object of study as static and atemporal, abstracting it from historical change. Finally, the founder of structuralist linguistics posited that langue was indeed a single system; he made its unity and systematicity consist in the putative fact that every signifier, every material, signifying element of the code, derives its meaning positionally through its difference from all of the others.

Together, these founding operations render the structuralist approach of limited utility for feminist purposes." Because it abstracts from parole, the structuralist model brackets questions of practice, agency, and the speaking subject. Thus, it cannot shed light on the discursive practices through which social identities and social groups are formed. Because this approach brackets the diachronic, moreover, it will not tell us anything about shifts in identities and affiliations over time. Similarly, because it abstracts from the social context of communication, the model brackets issues of power and inequality. Thus, it cannot illuminate the processes by which cultural hegemony is secured and contested. Finally, because the model theorizes the fund of available linguistic meanings as a single symbolic system, it lends itself to a monolithic v iew of signification that denies tensions and contradictions among social meanings. In short, by reducing discourse to a “ symbolic system," the structuralist model evacuates social agency, social conflict, and social practice.12

Let me now try to illustrate these problems by means of a brief discussion of Lacanianism. B y “ Lacanianism," I do not mean the actual thought of Jacques Lacan, which is far too complex to tackle here. I mean, rather, an ideal-typical neo-structuralist reading of Lacan that is widely credited among English-speaking feminists.'5 In discussing “ Lacanianism,” I shall bracket the question of the fidelity of this reading, which could be faulted for overemphasizing the influence of Saussure at the expense of other, countervailing influences, such as Hegel.'4 For my purposes, however, this ideal-typical, Saussurean reading of Lacan is useful precisely because it evinces with unusual clarity the difficulties that beset many conceptions of discourse that are widely considered “ poststructuralist” but that remain wedded in important respects to structuralism. Because their attempts to break free of structuralism remain abstract, such conceptions tend finally to recycle it. Lacanianism, as discussed here, is a paradigm case of “ neostructuralism.” '5

At first sight, neo-structuralist Lacanianism seems to promise some advantages for feminist theorizing. B y conjoining the Freudian problematic of the construction of gendered subjectivity to the Saussurean model of structural linguistics, it seems to provide each with its needed corrective. The introduction of the Freudian problematic promises to supply the speaking subject that is missing in Saussure and thereby to reopen the excluded questions about identity, speech, and social practice. Conversely, the use of the Saussurean model promises to remedy some of Freuds deficiencies. By insisting that gender identity is discursively constructed, Lacanianism appears to eliminate lingering vestiges of biologism in Freud, to treat gender as sociocultural all the way down, and to render it in principle more open to change.

Upon closer inspection, however, the promised advantages fail to materialize. Instead, Lacanianism begins to look viciously circular. On the one hand, it purports to describe the process by which individuals acquire gendered subjectivity through their painful conscription as young children into a pre-existing phallocentric symbolic order. Here the structure of the symbolic order is presumed to determine the character of individual subjectivity. But, on the other hand, the theory also purports to show that the symbolic order must necessarily be phallocentric since the attainment of subjectivity requires submission to “ the Father s Law.” Here, conversely, the nature of individual subjectivity, as dictated by an autonomous psychology, is presumed to determine the character of the symbolic order.

One result of this circularity is an apparently ironclad determinism. As Dorothy Leland has noted, the theory casts the developments it describes as necessary, invariant, and unalterable.16 Phallocentrism, womans disadvantaged place in the symbolic order, the encoding of cultural authority as masculine, the impossibility of describing a nonphallic sexuality— in short, any number of historically contingent trappings of male dominance— now appear as invariable features of the human condition. Womens subordination, then, is inscribed as the inevitable destiny of civilization.

I can spot several spurious steps in this reasoning, some of which have their roots in the presupposition of the structuralist model. First, to the degree Lacanianism has succeeded in eliminating biologism— and that is dubious for reasons I shall not go into here17 — it has replaced it with psychologism, the untenable view that autonomous psychological imperatives given independently of culture and history can dictate the way they are interpreted and acted on within culture and history.

FOOTNOTE 17 INSERTED

17 Here I believe one can properly speak of Lacan. Lacans claim to have overcome biologism rests on his insistence that the phallus is not the penis. However, many feminist critics have shown that he fails to prevent the collapse of the symbolic signifier into the organ. The clearest indication of this failure is his claim, in The Meaning of the Phallus,” that the phallus becomes the master signifier because of its “ turgidity” which suggests “ the transmission of vital flow” in copulation. See Jacques Lacan, “ T h e Meaning of the Phallus,” in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the ecole freudienne, eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, N ew York: W.W. N orton & Company, 1982.

END FOOTNOTE 17

Lacanianism falls prey to psychologism to the extent that it claims that the phallocentricity of the symbolic order is required by the demands of an enculturation process that is itself independent of culture.18

I f one h a lf of Lacanianism s circular argument is vitiated by psychologism, then the other half is vitiated by what I shall call symbolicism. B y symbolicism I mean, first, the homogenizing reification of diverse signifying practices into a monolithic and all-pervasive “ symbolic order,” and second, the endowing of that order with an exclusive and unlimited causal power tofix people s subjectivities once and for all. Symbolicism, then, is an operation whereby the structuralist abstraction langue is troped into a quasi-divinity, a normative “ symbolic order” whose power to shape identities dwarfs to the point of extinction that of mere historical institutions and practices.

Actually, as Deborah Cameron has noted, Lacan himself equivocates on the expression “ the symbolic order.” '9 Sometimes he uses this expression relatively narrowly to refer to Saussurean langue, the structure of language as a system of signs. In this narrow usage, Lacanianism would be committed to the implausible view that the sign system itself determines individuals’ subjectivities independently of the social context and social practice of its uses. At other times, Lacan uses the expression “ the symbolic order” far more broadly to refer to an amalgam that includes not only linguistic structures, but also cultural traditions and kinship structures, the latter mistakenly equated with social structure in general.20 In this broad usage, Lacanianism would conflate the ahistorical structural abstraction langue with variable historical phenomena like family forms and childrearing practices; cultural representations of love and authority in art, literature, and philosophy; the gender division of labor; forms of political organization and of other institutional sources of power and status. The result would be a conception of “ the symbolic order” that essentializes and homogenizes contingent historical practices and traditions, erasing tensions, contradictions, and possibilities for change. This would be a conception, moreover, that is so broad that the claim that it determines the structure of subjectivity risks collapsing into an empty tautology.21

The combination of psychologism and symbolicism in Lacanianism results in a conception of discourse that is of limited usefulness for feminist theorizing. To be sure, this conception offers an account of the discursive construction of social identity. However, it is not an account that can make sense of the complexity and multiplicity of social identities, the ways they are woven from a plurality of discursive strands. Granted, Lacanianism stresses that the apparent unity and simplicity of ego identity is imaginary, that the subject is irreparably split both by language and drives. B ut this insistence on fracture does not lead to an appreciation of the diversity of the socio-cultural discursive practices from which identities are woven. It leads, rather, to a unitary v iew of the human condition as inherently tragic. In fact, Lacanianism differentiates identities only in binary terms, along the single axis of having or lacking the phallus. As Luce Irigaray has shown, this phallic conception of sexual difference is not an adequate basis for understanding femininity22— nor, I would add, masculinity. Still less, then, is it able to shed light on other dimensions of social identities, including ethnicity, color, and social class. Nor could the theory be emended to incorporate these manifestly historical phenomena, given its postulation of an ahistorical, tension-free “ symbolic order” equated with kinship.23

Moreover, Lacanianism’s account of identity construction cannot account for identity shifts over time. It is committed to the general psychoanalytic proposition that gender identity (the only kind of identity it considers) is basically fixed once and for all with the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Lacanianism equates this resolution with the child’s entry into a fixed, monolithic, and all-powerful symbolic order. Thus, it actually increases the degree of identity fixity found in classical Freudian theory. It is true, as Jacqueline R o se points out, that the theory stresses that gender identity is always precarious, that its apparent unity and stability are always threatened by repressed libidinal drives.24 B ut this emphasis on precariousness is not an opening onto genuine historical thinking about shifts in peoples social identities. On the contrary, it is an insistence on a permanent, ahistorical condition, since for Lacanianism the only alternative to fixed gender identity is psychosis.

I f Lacanianism cannot provide an account of social identity that is useful for feminist theorizing, then it is unlikely to help us understand the formation of social groups. For Lacanianism, affiliation falls under the rubric of the imaginary. To affiliate with others, to align oneself with others in a social movement, would be tofall prey to the illusions of the imaginary ego. It would be to deny loss and lack, to seek an impossible unification and fulfillment. Thus, from the perspective of Lacanianism, collective movements would by definition be vehicles of delusion; they could not even in principle be emancipatory.25

Moreover, insofar as group formation depends on linguistic innovation, it is untheorizable from the perspective of Lacanianism. Because Lacanianism posits a fixed, monolithic symbolic system and a speaker who is wholly subjected to it, it is inconceivable that there could ever be any linguistic innovation. Speaking subjects could only ever reproduce the existing symbolic order; they could not possibly alter it. From this perspective, the question of cultural hegemony is blocked from view. There can be no question as to how the cultural authority of dominant groups in society is established and contested, no question of unequal negotiations between different social groups occupying different discursive positions. For Lacanianism, on the contrary, there is simply “ f/ie symbolic order,” a single universe of discourse that is so systematic, so all-pervasive, so monolithic that one cannot even conceive of such things as alternative perspectives, multiple discursive sites, struggles over social meanings, contests between hegemonic and counterhegemonic definitions of social situations, conflicts of interpretation of social needs. One cannot even conceive, really, of a plurality of different speakers.

With the way blocked to a political understanding of identities, groups, and cultural hegemony, the way is also blocked to an understanding of political practice. For one thing, there is no conceivable agent of such practice. Lacanianism posits a view of the person as a non-sutured congeries of three moments, none of which can qualify as a political agent. The speaking subject is simply the grammatical “ I,” a shifter wholly subjected to the symbolic order; it can only and forever reproduce that order. The ego is an imaginary projection, deluded about its own stability and self-possession, hooked on an impossible narcissistic desire for unity and self-completion; it therefore can only and forever tilt at windmills. Finally, there is the ambiguous unconscious, sometimes an ensemble of repressed libidinal drives, sometimes the face of language as Other, but never anything that could count as a social agent.

#### 2---Economics is improving with instantaneous information---imperfections are DAs to central planning not rules-based antitrust.

The Economist 10/23/21. "A real-time revolution will up-end the practice of macroeconomics". Economist. https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/10/23/a-real-time-revolution-will-up-end-the-practice-of-macroeconomics?utm\_campaign=the-economist-this-week&utm\_medium=newsletter&utm\_source=salesforce-marketing-cloud&utm\_term=2021-10-21&utm\_content=ed-picks-article-link-1&etear=nl\_weekly\_1

Yet, as we report this week, the age of bewilderment is starting to give way to greater enlightenment. The world is on the brink of a real-time revolution in economics, as the quality and timeliness of information are transformed. Big firms from Amazon to Netflix already use instant data to monitor grocery deliveries and how many people are glued to “Squid Game”. The pandemic has led governments and central banks to experiment, from monitoring restaurant bookings to tracking card payments. The results are still rudimentary, but as digital devices, sensors and fast payments become ubiquitous, the ability to observe the economy accurately and speedily will improve. That holds open the promise of better public-sector decision-making—as well as the temptation for governments to meddle.

The desire for better economic data is hardly new. America’s gnp estimates date to 1934 and initially came with a 13-month time lag. In the 1950s a young Alan Greenspan monitored freight-car traffic to arrive at early estimates of steel production. Ever since Walmart pioneered supply-chain management in the 1980s private-sector bosses have seen timely data as a source of competitive advantage. But the public sector has been slow to reform how it works. The official figures that economists track—think of gdp or employment—come with lags of weeks or months and are often revised dramatically. Productivity takes years to calculate accurately. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that central banks are flying blind.

Bad and late data can lead to policy errors that cost millions of jobs and trillions of dollars in lost output. The financial crisis would have been a lot less harmful had the Federal Reserve cut interest rates to near zero in December 2007, when America entered recession, rather than in December 2008, when economists at last saw it in the numbers. Patchy data about a vast informal economy and rotten banks have made it harder for India’s policymakers to end their country’s lost decade of low growth. The European Central Bank wrongly raised interest rates in 2011 amid a temporary burst of inflation, sending the euro area back into recession. The Bank of England may be about to make a similar mistake today.

The pandemic has, however, become a catalyst for change. Without the time to wait for official surveys to reveal the effects of the virus or lockdowns, governments and central banks have experimented, tracking mobile phones, contactless payments and the real-time use of aircraft engines. Instead of locking themselves in their studies for years writing the next “General Theory”, today’s star economists, such as Raj Chetty at Harvard University, run well-staffed labs that crunch numbers. Firms such as JPMorgan Chase have opened up treasure chests of data on bank balances and credit-card bills, helping reveal whether people are spending cash or hoarding it.

These trends will intensify as technology permeates the economy. A larger share of spending is shifting online and transactions are being processed faster. Real-time payments grew by 41% in 2020, according to McKinsey, a consultancy (India registered 25.6bn such transactions). More machines and objects are being fitted with sensors, including individual shipping containers that could make sense of supply-chain blockages. Govcoins, or central-bank digital currencies (cbdcs), which China is already piloting and over 50 other countries are considering, might soon provide a goldmine of real-time detail about how the economy works.

Timely data would cut the risk of policy cock-ups—it would be easier to judge, say, if a dip in activity was becoming a slump. And the levers governments can pull will improve, too. Central bankers reckon it takes 18 months or more for a change in interest rates to take full effect. But Hong Kong is trying out cash handouts in digital wallets that expire if they are not spent quickly. cbdcs might allow interest rates to fall deeply negative. Good data during crises could let support be precisely targeted; imagine loans only for firms with robust balance-sheets but a temporary liquidity problem. Instead of wasteful universal welfare payments made through social-security bureaucracies, the poor could enjoy instant income top-ups if they lost their job, paid into digital wallets without any paperwork.

The real-time revolution promises to make economic decisions more accurate, transparent and rules-based. But it also brings dangers. New indicators may be misinterpreted: is a global recession starting or is Uber just losing market share? They are not as representative or free from bias as the painstaking surveys by statistical agencies. Big firms could hoard data, giving them an undue advantage. Private firms such as Facebook, which launched a digital wallet this week, may one day have more insight into consumer spending than the Fed does.

Know thyself

The biggest danger is hubris. With a panopticon of the economy, it will be tempting for politicians and officials to imagine they can see far into the future, or to mould society according to their preferences and favour particular groups. This is the dream of the Chinese Communist Party, which seeks to engage in a form of digital central planning.

In fact no amount of data can reliably predict the future. Unfathomably complex, dynamic economies rely not on Big Brother but on the spontaneous behaviour of millions of independent firms and consumers. Instant economics isn’t about clairvoyance or omniscience. Instead its promise is prosaic but transformative: better, timelier and more rational decision-making. ■

#### 3---Regulated cap solves everything better.

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However, things are more complicated than the arguments above would suggest, and the benefits of capitalism, especially for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, are in fact myriad and significant. In addition, as we will see in this section, many experts argue that capitalism is not the fundamental cause of the previously described problems but rather an essential component of the best solutions to them and of the best methods for promoting our goals of health, well-being, and justice.

To see where the defenders of capitalism are coming from, consider an analogy involving a response to a pandemic: if a country administered a rushed and untested vaccine to its population that ended up killing people, we would not say that vaccines were the problem. Instead, the problem would be the flawed and sloppy policies of vaccine implementation. Vaccines might easily remain absolutely essential to the correct response to such a pandemic and could also be essential to promoting health and flourishing, more generally.

The argument is similar with capitalism according to the leading mainstream arguments in favor of it: Capitalism is an essential part of the best society we could have, just like vaccines are an essential part of the best response to a pandemic such as COVID-19. But of course both capitalism and vaccines can be implemented poorly, and can even do harm, especially when combined with other incorrect policy decisions. But that does not mean that we should turn against them—quite the opposite. Instead, we should embrace them as essential to the best and most just outcomes for society, and educate ourselves and others on their importance and on how they must be properly designed and implemented with other policies in order to best help us all. In fact, the argument in favor of capitalism is even more dramatic because it claims that much more is at stake than even what is at stake in response to a global pandemic—what is at stake with capitalism is nothing less than whether the world's poorest and most vulnerable billion people will remain in conditions of poverty and oppression, or if they will instead finally gain access to what is minimally necessary for basic health and wellbeing and become increasingly affluent and empowered. The argument in favor of capitalism proceeds as follows:

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred in the last two centuries, largely as a result of societies adopting or moving toward capitalism. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree under any alternative noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism dramatically outweigh the negative consequences (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it can become well-regulated so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

* optimally8 regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9
* ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10
* ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and
* ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. Society can still do much better and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

Premise 3. Development and the future. If the global spread of capitalism is allowed to continue, desperate poverty can be essentially eliminated in our lifetimes. Furthermore, this can be accomplished faster and in a more just way via well-regulated global capitalism than by any alternatives. If we instead opt for less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization, then desperate poverty will continue to exist for a significant portion of the world's population into the further future, and the world will be a worse and less equitable place than it would have been with more capitalism. For example, in a world with less capitalism, there would be more overpopulation, food insecurity, air pollution, ill health, injustice, and other problems. In part, this is because of the factors identified by premise 1, which connect a turn away from capitalism with a turn away from continuing improvements in health, wellbeing, and justice, especially for the developing world. In addition, fertility declines are also a consequence of increased wealth, and the size of the population is a primary determinant of food demand and other environmental stressors.13 Finally, as discussed at length in the next section of the essay, capitalism can be naturally combined with optimal environmental regulations.14 Even bracketing anything like optimal regulation, it remains true that sufficiently wealthy nations reduce environmental degradation as they become wealthier, whereas developing nations that are nearing peak degradation will remain stuck at the worst levels of degradation if we stall growth, rather than allowing them to transition to less and less degradation in the future via capitalism and economic growth.15 In contrast, well-regulated capitalism is a key part of the best way of coping with these problems, as well as a key part of dealing with climate change, global food production, and other specific challenges, as argued at length in the next section. Here it is important to stress that we should favor well-regulated capitalism that includes correct investments in public goods over other capitalist systems such as the neoliberalism of the recent past that promoted inadequately regulated capitalism with inadequate concern for externalities, equity, and background distortions and injustices.16

Conclusion. Therefore, we should be in favor of capitalism over noncapitalism, and we should especially favor well-regulated capitalism, which is the ethically optimal economic system and is essential to any just basic structure for society.

This argument is impressive because, as stated earlier in the essay, it is based on evidence that is so striking that it leads a bipartisan range of open-minded thinkers and activists to endorse well-regulated capitalism, including many of those who were not initially attracted to the view because of a reasonable concern for the societal ills with which we began. To better understand why such a range of thinkers could agree that well-regulated capitalism is best, it may help to clarify some things that are not assumed or implied by the argument for it, which could be invoked by other bad arguments for capitalism.

One thing the argument above does not assume is that health, wellbeing, or justice are the same thing as wealth, because, in fact, they are not. Instead, the argument above relies on well-accepted, measurable indicators of health and wellbeing, such as increased lifespan; decreased early childhood mortality; adequate nutrition; and other empirically measurable leading indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice.17 Similarly, the argument that capitalism promotes justice, peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance relies on empirical metrics for each of these.18

Furthermore, the argument does not assume that because these indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice are highly correlated with high degrees of capitalism, that therefore capitalism is the direct cause of these good outcomes. Rather, the analyses suggest instead that something other than capitalism is the direct cause of societal improvements (such as improvements in knowledge and technology, public infrastructure, and good governance), and that capitalism is simply a necessary condition for these improvements to happen.19 In other words, the richer a society is, the more it is able to invest in all of these and other things that are the direct causes of health, wellbeing, and justice. But, to maximize investment in these things societies need well-regulated capitalism.

As part of these analyses, it is often stressed that current forms of capitalism around the world are highly defective and must be reformed in the direction of well-regulated capitalism because they lack investments in public goods, such as basic knowledge, healthcare, nutrition, other safety nets, and good governance.20 In this way, an argument for a particular kind of progressive reformism is an essential part of the analyses that lead many to endorse the more general argument for well-regulated capitalism.

Although these analyses are nuanced, and appropriately so, it remains the case that the things that directly lead to health, wellbeing, and justice require resources, and the best path toward generating those resources is well-regulated capitalism. And on the flip side, according to the analyses behind premise 1 described above, an anti-capitalist system would not produce the resources that are needed, and would thus be a disaster, especially for the poorest billion people who are most desperately in need of the resources that capitalism can create and direct, to escape from extreme poverty.21’